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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under section 78A-4-103(2)(j) of 
the Utah Code. The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction under section 78A-3-
102(3)(j) of the Utah Code and assigned the case to th£ court of appeals on May 6, 
2009. The appellee, Allstate Insurance Company, claims that the Court does not 
have jurisdiction over the Casadays' appeal from the denial of their post-
judgment motion and has filed a motion for summary disposition on that issue, 
which the Casadays have opposed. By an order dated August 21, 2009, the Court 
denied Allstate's motion and deferred a ruling on the issue pending "plenary 
presentation and consideration of the case." To the extent necessary to preserve 
their arguments, the Casadays incorporate by reference their memorandum in 
opposition to Allstate's motion for summary disposition in this brief. 
ISSUES 
1. Under Utah's notice pleading rules, all that is required is that the 
parties be given notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. 
Allstate had notice that the Casadays were claiming t^ hat their underinsured 
motorist coverage should have been equal to their liability coverage and had an 
opportunity to dispute that claim. Did the trial court err in granting Allstate 
1 
summary judgment on the grounds that the Casadays did not properly plead 
their claims? 
Preservation: The issue was raised in the plaintiffs, memorandum in 
opposition to Allstate's motion for summary judgment (Record ("R.") 431-700); in 
the oral arguments on that motion (R. 844, at 10:21-17:25); in the plaintiffs' motion 
to alter or amend the judgment, to conform the pleadings to the evidence, or for 
leave to amend (R. 765-66); in their memorandum in support of that motion (R. 
725-35); in their reply memorandum on that motion (R. 806-18); and in the oral 
argument on that motion (R. 872 at 4:9-13:5). 
Standard of Review: In reviewing a district court's entry of summary 
judgment, the court applies the same standard as the district court:1 summary 
judgment is only appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.2 Thus, the 
Court must determine whether the trial court correctly held that there was no 
genuine issue of material fact and whether it erred in applying the governing 
1
 E.g., English v. Kienke, 774, P.2d 1154,1156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), affd, 
848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993). 
2
 UTAH R. Qv. P. 56(c). 
2 
law.3 This Court reviews the district court's legal conclusions for correctness, 
granting it no deference, and reviews the facts and all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from them in the light most favorable to the itonmoving party (here, the 
Casadays).4 It will affirm only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.D 
2. A complaint that cites to an inapplicable statute still raises a good 
claim if it puts the defendant on notice, the defendant is not prejudiced by the 
error, and the claim would be actionable under the correct statute. The trial court 
granted Allstate summary judgment because, it concluded, the complaint cited to 
the wrong subsection of the underinsured motorist statute, even though Allstate 
had notice of the correct subsection and defended it$ actions under that 
subsection. Should the trial court have altered or amended its judgment? 
Preservation: The issue was raised in the plaintiffs' motion to alter or 
amend the judgment (R. 765-66), their memorandum in support of that motion 
3
 See Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol 2003 LJT19, % 5, 70 P.3d 72 
(citations omitted). 
4
 Id. 
5
 Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49, f 38, P.3d _ 
(citations omitted). 
3 
(R. 725-35), their reply memorandum on that motion (R. 806-18), and the oral 
argument on that motion (R. 872 at 4:9-13:5). 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision on a motion to alter or amend 
a judgment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.6 
3. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by the express or 
implied consent of the parties, they must be treated as if they had been raised in 
the pleadings. The parties here conducted extensive discovery on whether 
Allstate complied with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(9)(g) 
(2001). Did the trial court err in refusing to conform the pleadings to the 
evidence? 
Preservation: The issue was raised in the plaintiffs' memorandum in 
opposition to Allstate's motion for summary judgment (R. 434-35, 437-48); in the 
oral arguments on that motion (R. 844, at 10:21-17:25, especially 15:16-16:17); in 
the plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend the judgment, to conform the pleadings to 
6
 See Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434 (Utah 1993) ('"A motion . . . to 
modify a final judgment is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, the 
exercise of which must be based on sound legal principles in light of all relevant 
circumstances/") (citation omitted). But see Wickland v. American Travellers Life 
Ins. Co., 513 S.E.2d 657, syllabus pt. 2 (W. Va. 1998) (the standard of review for an 
appeal from a motion to alter or amend a judgment is the same standard that 
would apply to the underlying judgment upon which the motion is based and 
from which the appeal is filed). 
4 
the evidence, or for leave to amend (R. 765-66); in their memorandum in support 
of that motion (R. 735-39); in their reply memorandum on that motion (R. 818-26); 
and in the oral argument on that motion (R. 872 at 6:7-23; 10:3-13:5). 
Standard of Review: The trial court's application of Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(b) is a legal question that this Court reviews for correctness.7 
Under rule 15(b), amendment is mandatory if the parties tried the issue by 
express or implied consent, and a trial court's conclusion that the parties did or 
did not try an issue by express or implied consent is a legal conclusion that the 
appellate court reviews for correctness.8 However, "^because the trial court's 
determination of whether the issues were tried with $11 parties' "implied 
consent" is highly fact intensive,'" the trial court is granted "'a fairly broad 
measure of discretion in making that determination under a given set of facts.'"9 
Under rule 15(b), amendment is permissive if a party has objected to evidence 
because it was not raised in the pleadings. Under this provision, the appellate 
7
 Keller v. Southwood N. Med. Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102,105 (Utah 
1998) (citation omitted). 
8
 See Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc., 1999 UT 13,I8 , 974 P.2d 288 
(citing Keller, 959 P.2d at 105). 
9
 Id. (quoting Keller, 959 P.2d at 105). 
5 
court applies a '"conditional discretionary review/"10 The trial court must first 
determine that "'the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved'" 
by allowing an amendment and that "'the admission of such evidence would not 
prejudice the adverse party in maintaining his action or defense on the merits/"11 
The trial court has "'only limited discretion'" in making these threshold 
determinations, but once it does, it has "'full discretion to allow an amendment of 
the pleadings/"12 
4. Leave to amend a pleading should be freely given when justice so 
requires. The plaintiffs asked for leave to amend their complaint to delete a 
reference to an inapplicable sub-subsection of the underinsured motorist statute, 
which the trial court denied. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
the plaintiffs leave to amend? 
Preservation: The issue was raised in the plaintiffs' motion to alter or 
amend the judgment, to conform the pleadings to the evidence, or for leave to 
amend (R. 765-66); their memorandum in support of that motion (R. 735-39); their 
Id. 1 9 (citation omitted). 
Id. (quoting England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340, 345 (Utah 1997)). 
Id. (quoting England, 944 P.2d at 345). 
6 
10 
n 
12 
reply memorandum on that motion (R. 826-30); and the oral argument on that 
motion (R. 872 at 12:6-13:5). 
Standard of Review: A denial of a motion to amend pleadings is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion.13 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Former section 31 A-22-305(9) of the Utah Code Annotated and Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 8 and 56 govern the first issue. Ut^h Rule of Civil Procedure 
59(e) governs the second issue. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) governs the 
third issue. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) goverjns the fourth issue. The 
relevant provisions of the statute and these rules are set out in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Court 
Below. 
The plaintiffs, Raymond and Ellen Casaday, brought this action against 
their auto insurer, Allstate Insurance Company, for breach of contract, bad faith, 
13
 Aurora Credit Sews., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273,1281 
(Utah 1998); Kasco Sews. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah 1992). 
7 
and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress for not providing 
them with underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage equal to the limits of their 
automobile liability coverage. (See R. 1-10.) 
At the close of discovery, Allstate moved for summary judgment (R. 419-
20), and the trial court granted the motion (see R. 715-22 & addendum; see also R. 
800-03). The plaintiffs filed a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment, to 
conform the pleadings to the evidence, or for leave to amend (R. 765-67), which 
the trial court denied (see R. 846-51 & addendum; see also R. 865-68). The 
plaintiffs then appealed. (See R. 858-60.)14 
B. Statement of Facts 
Raymond and Ellen Casaday were seriously injured in March 2006 when a 
car driven by a sixteen-year-old made an illegal left turn in front of them, totaling 
their vehicle. (See R. 438, *[ 1.) Raymond Casaday was eighty-five years old at 
the time, and his wife, Ellen, was eighty-two. Raymond incurred more than 
14
 The notice of appeal was filed after the trial court's memorandum 
decision denying the Casadays' post-judgment motion but before entry of the 
order denying the motion. The Casadays did not file another notice of appeal, 
which is the basis for Allstate's motion for summary disposition. Additional 
facts relating to the course of proceedings in the trial court and the issues on 
appeal are set out in the Statement of Facts, infra, and in the Casadays' 
memorandum in opposition to Allstate's motion for summary disposition. 
8 
$145,000 in medical bills, and Ellen incurred more than $55,000. (See R. 438,12.) 
The Casadays settled with the at-fault driver for his policy limits of $25,000 per 
person and made a claim for UIM benefits from their own auto insurer, Allstate. 
(See R. 438, %% 3-4.) Much to their surprise, Allstate informed the Casadays that 
their UIM limits were only $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident, even 
though their policy provided liability coverage of $100,000 per person and 
$300,000 per accident. (See R. 12; R. 438-39, % 5.) 
The Casadays had been insured by Allstate siqce 1966. (See R. 357,f3.) At 
that time, Utah law did not provide for either uninsured motorist (UM) or 
underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. Utah law began requiring UM coverage 
in 198515 but did not require UIM coverage until 1993.16 As originally enacted, 
the UIM statute only required UIM coverage of $10,000 per person and allowed 
an insured to reject UM/UIM coverage.17 
In 2000, the Utah Legislature enacted S.B. 189, which amended the 
UM/UIM statute to make the presumptive limits of UM and UIM coverage the 
15
 See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31 A-22-302(l)(b) & -305 (1986). 
16
 See 1992 Utah Laws ch. 132, §§ 1 & 3, codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 
31A-22-305(8)-(10) (1994). 
17
 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-305(9)(a) & (c)(i) (1994). 
9 
same as the limits for liability coverage. The reason for the amendment was that 
the legislature thought that consumers did not understand what they were 
buying. Consumers thought that when they bought insurance they were buying 
protection for themselves and their families as well as for third parties, and they 
thought that the protection they were buying was the same for all three groups. 
The bill was meant to bring auto policies in line with the insureds' expectations. 
The insured could still choose not to carry as much UM/UIM coverage as liability 
coverage, but the insurer had to provide the insured with enough information 
that the insured could make an informed decision.18 
As originally proposed, the bill made no distinction between new policies 
and renewal policies.19 But the statute that was ultimately enacted provided: 
(9)(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the 
limits of underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser 
of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the 
maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits available by the 
insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy, unless the insured 
purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an 
acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that: 
18
 See Senate floor debate on 1st Sub. S.B. 189 (day 30, Feb. 15, 2000, 
tape 28) (remarks of Sen. Waddoups); House floor debate on 1st Sub. S.B. 189 
(day 45, Mar. 1, 2000) (remarks of Rep. Koehn). 
19
 See bill file on S.B. 189, drafts, at 83. 
10 
(i) waives the higher coverage; 
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist 
coverage; and 
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase 
underinsured motorist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the 
limits of the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the 
maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits available by the 
insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policjy. 
(g)(i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent 
after January 1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer 
shall disclose in the same medium as the premium renewal notice, 
an explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage 
and the costs associated with increasing the coverage in amounts up 
to and including the maximum amount available by the insurer 
under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry 
underinsured motorist coverage limits in an amount less than the 
insured's motor vehicle liability policy limits or the maximum 
underinsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer 
under the insured's motor vehicle policy.20 
20
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-305(9) (2001), enacted by 2000 Utah Laws 
ch. 188, § 1. At the time of the Casadays' accident, subsection (g) had been 
renumbered subsection (h) and additional subdivision designations had been 
added to subsection (h). See UTAH CODE A N N . § 31 A-22-305(9)(b) & (h) (2005). 
For the current statute, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-305.3(2)(b) & (h) (Supp. 
2009). The Casadays will refer to subsection (g), the subsection in effect when 
Allstate should have provided them with the statutory notices, except when 
quoting record references to subsection (h). 
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The Casadays never signed an acknowledgment waiving the higher limits 
of UIM coverage, under subsection (b) (R. 26,1 8), and Allstate did not send the 
Casadays the required disclosures with their first two renewal notices under 
subsection (g) (see R. 463; 439; 442-43, Tl 15-16; 545:1-5; 559:21-561:15; 611-12; 
667). If Allstate had given the Casadays the required notices, the Casadays 
would have increased their UIM coverage to match their liability limits. (See R. 
545:12-546:8; 554:14-23; 557:9-18; 558:8-11.) 
When the Casadays (through their son) first contacted Allstate about UIM 
coverage, Parm Chavez, the Allstate adjuster handling the claim, noticed that the 
Casadays' UIM limits were only one-tenth as much as their liability limits, so she 
investigated to see if the Casadays had been sent the two notices required by 
subsection (g). (See R. 578:8-20; R. 583:3-9. See also R. 335, at 14:19-25.) Ms. 
Chavez never found two notices. (See R. 589:22-25; R. 590:9-24; R. 601:6-12.) 
Nevertheless, Allstate told the Casadays that it had sent them the two notices 
required by subsection (g) and told them and their attorney that they only had 
$10,000/$20,000 in UIM coverage. (See R. 594:17-23; R. 599:4-14; 608:11-609:13; R. 
639:11-16.) Allstate based its position on a notice that it purportedly sent to the 
Casadays in April 2001, not in connection with any renewal of their policy. Yet 
12 
Allstate never gave the Casadays a copy of that notice until after they brought 
this action and after the original discovery deadline had passed. 
Because Allstate refused to pay the Casadays more than $20,000 in UIM 
benefits, the Casadays brought this action against AlMate, alleging claims for 
breach of contract, bad faith, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. (See R. 1-10.) Their complaint alleged that the Casadays should have 
had UIM coverage equal to their liability coverage. (JSee, e.g., R. 3, \ 10 ("Plaintiffs 
should have been entitled to the protection of their uhderinsured motorist 
coverage issued by defendant in a minimum amount of $100,000 per person, up 
to $300,000 per occurrence/'). See also R. 335, at 3:15-4:9.) Allstate recognized as 
much. (See R. 357 ("Plaintiffs base all four of [their] causes of action on the 
allegation that Defendant should have provided higher UIM limits than the 
amount purchased by Plaintiffs and expressly stated in the policy/').) 
One paragraph of the complaint alleged: 
Pursuant to § 31 A-22-305(9)(b), Utah Code Annotated, the 
limits of underinsured motorist coverage required to be provided to 
plaintiffs was an amount equal to the lesser of the limits of their 
liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage 
limits available by the insurer under the insured's automobile 
insurance policy, unless the insured purchased coverage in a lesser 
amount by signing an acknowledgment form meeting certain 
statutory requirements. 
13 
(R. 2 , 1 6.) 
Allstate answered this paragraph as follows: 
The subject statute speaks for itself; [Allstate] denies the 
application of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(b) (2001), inasmuch 
as plaintiffs' insurance policy with Allstate had been in place for 
many years and was therefore "existing" as of January 1, 2001, with 
renewals in 2001 and thereafter, as a result of which Utah Code Ann, 
§ 31A-22-305(9)(g) (2001) specifically applies in lieu of subsection 
9(b); Allstate fully complied with the provisions of subsection 9(g); 
[Allstate] denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 6. 
(R. 25 ,1 6. See also R. 26, <f 12 (alleging that Allstate had complied "with Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(g) (2001).") 
In its fourth defense to the Casadays' complaint, Allstate alleged: 
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A~22-305(9)(g) (2001) directly governs the 
Underinsured Motorist coverage limits of plaintiffs' automobile 
policy with Allstate, and defendant Allstate fully complied with the 
requirements and provisions of that statute in establishing and 
continuing the policy limits of plaintiffs' coverage, including but not 
limited to sending plaintiffs the required statutory notices in 2001. 
(R. 28.) Similarly, Allstate's fourteenth defense alleged that there could not be 
"any good faith argument that Allstate's interpretation of the subject statute, 
specifically Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(g) (2001) based on the express terms 
thereof, constitutes bad faith." (R. 30.) 
Allstate served requests for admissions on the Casadays, asking them, 
among other things, to admit "that there is a reasonable basis for Allstate's 
14 
contention that Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(9)(g)(2Q01) governs the amount of 
Underinsured Motorist policy limits applicable to your claims/' The Casadays 
admitted that 
not only does Utah Code Ann. § 31A~22-305(9)(g)(2001) govern the 
amount of the plaintiffs' policy limits, but that § 31A-22-
305(9)(b)(2001) may also apply, since, whenever plaintiffs added or 
deleted a vehicle from their policy of insurance, the policy may be 
considered a "new polic[y]." 
(R. 464 (citations omitted).) Allstate also asked the Casadays to admit "that if 
Utah Code Ann. §31 A-22-305(9)(g)(2001) applies to your claims, then the amount 
of your UIM policy limits is $10,000/$20,000." The Casadays denied this request 
"since Allstate did not comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
22-305(9)(g)(2001)." (R. 464.) 
The parties engaged in extensive discovery. (See R. 46-80 (certificates of 
service of discovery requests and responses and notices of depositions).) Much 
of this discovery, including virtually all of the deposition testimony of Allstate 
employees, was directed at whether Allstate sent the Casadays the two notices 
required by subsection (9)(g), and Allstate did not object to this line of 
questioning. (See, e.g., R. 86-89, « 7-17; 99; 102-05; 108-09; 111; 119-22; 127; 185-
86, HI 2-5; 201:9-202:25; 219-20, f 2; R. 872, at 6:18-23,11:20-22.) Those notices 
should have been sent to the Casadays in connection with the renewals of their 
15 
policy that took place on February 16, 2001, and August 16, 2001. (See R. 87, % 
10.) 
The Casadays sent interrogatories asking Allstate to provide information 
about the notices that they sent to the Casadays as "required by Utah Code Ann. 
§31 A-22-305(9)(h)(2000)." Allstate responded that it could not answer the 
interrogatories "because, after reviewing the uninsured and underinsured 
motorist statute, [Allslate] does not believe that Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-
305(9)(h) (2000) exists." (See R. 121-22.) Allstate was correct that subsection (h) 
did not exist in 2000; before 2003, the relevant subsection was (g), not (h).21 A 
2003 amendment to the UM/UIM statute redesignated subsection (g) subsection 
(h).22 Allstate itself, however, sometimes cited the relevant statute as section 31A-
22-305(9)(h). (See R. 113,1 2.) Nevertheless, in response to the plaintiffs' 
discovery requests, Allstate produced a copy of the notice that it claimed to have 
sent the Casadays on August 16, 2001 (see R. 87-88,f12), but it claimed that it 
could not find the notice that should have been sent with the February 16, 2001 
See supra note 20. 
See 2003 Utah Laws ch. 218, § 2. 
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renewal. (See R. 103-05.) That was because no notice was ever sent with the 
Casadays' first renewal. (See R. 335, at 12:23-13:3.) 
After the plaintiffs amended their requests to clarify the proper subsection 
designation, Allstate "did some more checking" (R. 335, at 16:1-3), and, on 
January 3, 2008, three days after the original discovety cut-off date (see R. 38,f 
2.b), counsel for Allstate sent the plaintiffs a copy of a notice it claimed to have 
sent the Casadays in April 2001 (see R. 88, f 13; 94-96; 99). Curiously, the notice 
was not dated, was not addressed to the Casadays, did not reference their policy 
number, did not show their address, and in fact showed the wrong ZIP code for 
the Casadays. (See R. 94-96; R. 128.) Allstate claimed that this notice satisfied its 
obligation to send the Casadays notice with their February 16, 2001, renewal, 
even though it was not sent until some two months after that renewal, if at all. 
(See R. 623:1-624:23.) 
Based on the late production of this document^ the plaintiffs asked the 
court to modify the case management order to extend the time for them to amend 
their pleadings and complete discovery. (See R. 81-111,128.) While this motion 
was pending, Allstate filed a motion to compel the plaintiffs to produce all 
communications between them and Allstate for the last ten to fifteen years, 
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claiming that the communications "are integral to this case because the claims 
being made by plaintiffs include their never having received notice of the new 
2001 UIM law that defendant maintains it sent them." (See R. 159.) 
At the hearing on the Casadays' motion to modify the case management 
order, counsel for Allstate acknowledged that the case arose out of the change in 
the UIM law in 2001 (R. 335, at 9:18-21), that the change required a written waiver 
for new policies (R. 335, at 10:8-12), but, for renewal policies, required written 
notice to the insured in the next two renewal notices (R. 335, at 11:1-9), which was 
"this situation" (R. 335, at 11:10-11). Allstate claimed it sent the Casadays the two 
required notices (R. 335, at 11:11) but admitted that the first notice was "two or 
three months late" (R. 335, at 13:10-11). According to Allstate, "what we had here 
is a situation where the parties interpret this statute differently" (not where they 
disagreed about what statute applied). (R. 335, at 12:10-12.) Allstate admitted 
that, when it did its initial disclosures, it "knew that we needed to produce that 
information regarding these [two renewal] notices as part of initial disclosures," 
but it was not then able to find the first notice. (R. 335, at 13:12-17.) 
The trial court noted that, whether Allstate sent the two notices required by 
section 31 A-22-305(9)(g) "appears to be a very relevant issue." (See R. 335, at 
22:16-22.) The court let the Casadays take two additional depositions to discover 
18 
"how the 2001 Allstate Notices to Utah insureds wer£ generated, when and how 
they were sent, and letter or notice issues." (R. 268.) The Casadays asked for a 
deadline to amend the pleadings (R. 335, at 31:12-13), but the court refused the 
request (see R. 335, at 33:14-19). 
One of the additional depositions revealed that, for many other existing 
policyholders who were not sent the required notice with their first renewal 
notice, Allstate conformed their policies to provide UIM coverage equal to their 
liability coverage (see R. 698:6-700:2; see also R. 628A:5-629:13), but Allstate 
continued to refuse to do so for the Casadays. 
The court also let Allstate depose the Casadays (R. 268), and both plaintiffs 
were questioned, without objection, about Allstate's alleged compliance with 
subsection (g). (See R. 545:1-546:8; 554:1-556:12; 557:1-22; 558:8-16; 559:6-561:15.) 
The Casadays provided reports from their two liability experts, who 
opined that Allstate had failed to comply with the 2001 UM/UIM law, including 
subsection (g). (See R. 273-304.) 
Allstate's liability expert, Joseph E. Minnock, noted in his report that the 
Casadays7 complaint only cited section 31 A-22-303(2)(b), which dealt with new 
policies. Nevertheless, Mr. Minnock addressed "the renewal notice theory," 
19 
under subsection (g), and conceded that "it is undisputed that the statute was not 
technically complied with/7 (See R. 342.) Mr. Minnock still opined that Allstate 
complied with subsection (g). (R. 345.) In his deposition, Mr. Minnock testified, 
"[Ojbviously if you're asking me whether or not the claims at this point are 
sufficiently developed, that the case will be tried on all these theories [i.e., that the 
policy was a new policy, triggering subsection (b), or a renewal policy, triggering 
subsection (g)], [my answer is] of course/7 (R. 564:7-10.) 
Allstate moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the Casadays 
claimed that Allstate "failed to provide UIM benefits consistent with Utah Code 
Ann. § 31 A-22-305(9)(b)," but, because "this section only applies to 'new' 
policies" and because the Casadays' policy was not a "new" policy but a renewal 
policy, "Plaintiffs' claim of entitlement to higher UIM coverage under subsection 
'b' fails as a matter of law." (SeeR. 363. See generally R. 356-420.) 
The Casadays responded to Allstate's motion by showing that, among 
other things, "[although plaintiffs were at one time relying, in part, on 
subsection (b), since the very inception of this case, they have been relying, 
primarily, on" subsection (g), and that there were genuine issues of material fact 
20 
as to whether Allstate complied with subsection (g). (See R. 434, resp. to 1 5, & 
448.) 
Following a hearing (see R. 844), the court granted Allstate's motion for 
summary judgment. (See R. 715-21, addendum.) The Casadays then filed a 
motion to alter or amend the judgment, to conform the pleadings to the evidence, 
or for leave to amend. (R. 765-67.) Following another hearing (see R. 872), the 
court denied that motion (see R. 846-50 & addendum; R. 865-68). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah law favors resolution of disputes on their merits. Under Utah's 
liberal notice pleading rules, all that is required is that the parties have notice of 
the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. The Casadays brought this 
action because Allstate refused to conform their UIM limits to their liability 
limits. Allstate told the Casadays that the notices required by Utah law had been 
given when in fact they had not been. Allstate knew that it had to provide a copy 
of the required notices with its initial disclosures, but it withheld a letter it 
claimed met its notice requirement until after the time for amending pleadings 
and after fact discovery had passed. It then moved for summary judgment on a 
21 
hypertechnicality—that the Casadays7 complaint referred only to the sub-
subsection of Utah's UIM statute dealing with new policies, not existing policies. 
The Casadays' claim, however, was broader than that. It was that Allstate should 
have conformed their UIM limits to their liability limits (as, it turned out, Allstate 
had done for others in their position). Allstate knew even before the Casadays 
filed this action that it had to comply with the provision governing existing 
policies; it pleaded as much in its answer, and the parties conducted exhaustive 
discovery on that issue. Whether or not Allstate complied with the UIM statute 
raised genuine issues of material fact—issues about which all parties were not 
only aware but were actively and aggressively litigating. 
The trial court's reading of the Casadays' complaint and its application of 
the governing Utah law was hypertechnical and made the Casadays offenders for 
a single, superfluous letter.23 Not only did the trial court err in granting Allstate's 
motion for summary judgment (pt. I), but it also compounded its error by 
refusing to alter or amend its judgment (pt. II), to amend the pleadings to 
conform to the evidence (pt. Ill), or to otherwise allow the Casadays to amend 
their complaint (pt. IV). The Court should therefore reverse the summary 
23
 Cf. Isaiah 29:21 (condemning those who "make a man an offender for 
a word"). 
22 
judgment in favor of Allstate and remand this case to the district court for a 
consideration of the Casadays' claims on their merits. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ALLSTATE'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The law and policy in this state has always favored trials on the merits.24 
The "fundamental purpose" of Utah's notice pleading rules is to liberalize "both 
pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are afforded the privilege of 
presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their 
24
 See, e.g., Bonneville Tower Condominium Mgmt. Comm. v. Thompson 
Michie Assocs., 728 P.2d 1017,1020 (Utah 1986) ("Our rules of procedure are 
intended to encourage the adjudication of disputes on their merits."); Meyers v. 
Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah 1981) ("In the absence of prejudice, it is 
appropriate to pursue that policy which favors resolution of disputes on the 
merits rather than technicalities."). See also Toman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,181 
(1962) ("It is too late in the day and entirely contrary to the spirit of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of 
. . . mere technicalities."). Because the Utah Rules of Pivil Procedure were 
patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (Utah courts can consider 
cases under the federal rules in construing the Utah rules. See, e.g., Winegar v. 
Slim Olson, Inc., 122 Utah 487, 252 P.2d 205, 207 (195^). 
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dispute/ If the underlying facts or circumstances that the plaintiff relies on 
may be a proper subject of relief, the plaintiff ought to be given an opportunity to 
test his or her claims on the merits.26 Under Utah law, all that is required is that 
the parties have "notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them/'27 
The complaint "is required only to '* * * give the opposing party fair notice of the 
nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of 
litigation involved/"28 The complaint must "contain (1) a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a 
demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled,"29 but 
"[n]o technical forms of pleading . . . are required."30 
25
 Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 970 (Utah 1982) (quoting 
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963)). See also id. at 970-71 
("'Our rules provide for liberality to allow examination into and settlement of all 
issues bearing upon the controversy'") (quoting Cheney, 381 P.2d at 91). 
26
 Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. 
27
 E.g., Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 
1374 (Utah 1996) (quoting Cheney, 381 P.2d at 91). 
28
 Williams, 656 P.2d at 970 (emphasis added) (quoting Blackham v. 
Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d 157, 280 P.2d 453, 455 (1955)). 
29
 UTAH R. Qv. P. 8(a). 
30
 Id. 8(e)(1). 
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Thus, a complaint "need not set out all of the applicable law or facts, 
provided it notifies the defendant of the claim's nature/'31 That is because a 
complaint "limns the claim; details of both fact and law come later, in other 
documents."32 
The Casadays' complaint, which must "be so construed as to do substantial 
justice,"33 alleged that Allstate breached its contract With the Casadays and acted 
in bad faith, among other things, by not providing them with UIM limits equal to 
their liability limits. (See R. 3 ,110 ("Plaintiffs should have been entitled to the 
protection of their underinsured motorist coverage issued by defendant in a 
minimum amount of $100,000 per person, up to $300,000 per occurrence."); R. 4, 
f 12 ("In violation of Utah law and contrary to the facts, defendant advised 
plaintiffs that their policy of insurance only provided underinsured motorist 
coverage in the amount of $10,000, up to $20,000 per occurrence."); R. 5, f f 15-16 
("The defendant has refused to pay the limits of underinsured motorist coverage 
required by the policy and by law," and its refusal tq do so constitutes a breach of 
31
 Board of Trustees, Sheet Metal Workers' Ndt'l Pension Fund v. Elite 
Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031,1038 (7th Cir. 2000). 
32
 Bartholet v. Reishauer AG. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073,1078 (7th Cir. 1992). 
33
 UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(f). 
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contract).) These allegations, if proved, would entitle the Casadays to relief and 
were therefore sufficient to state a claim under rule 8. 
Allstate moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the Casadays' 
complaint "alleges that they had a 'new policy' in 2001, that they never signed a 
waiver of underinsured motorist coverage, and that Allstate therefore failed to 
comply with Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(9)(b)." (See R. 715.) Allstate claimed 
that it was entitled to summary judgment on all of the Casadays' claims because 
they all stemmed from their allegation that their policy was a new policy 
governed by subsection (b) and because it was undisputed that their policy was 
not a new policy but a renewal policy. 
In granting Allstate's motion, the trial court noted that, while the complaint 
was "indeed, vague with respect to whether the reference is to a 'new' or 
'existing' policy," the plaintiffs "specifically reference Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
305(9)(b), which addresses 'new' policies only," and made no reference to 
subsection (g), dealing with existing policies. (R. 720.) The court found that the 
Casadays' argument that their UIM coverage should have been equal to their 
liability coverage because Allstate did not give them the notices required by 
subsection (g) "is directly contrary to their previous position and no attempt was 
made to even suggest the issue as an alternate theory. Consequently, Allstate did 
26 
not have adequate notice and the issue is not properly before the Court/ ' (R. 720-
21.) 
The trial court was correct that the Casadays' complaint was at best 
'Vague" with respect to whether their policy was a new or existing policy, but it 
was wrong that the Casadays' position that Allstate could also be liable if their 
policy was a renewal policy was "directly contrary to their previous position" 
and that the Casadays never suggested "the issue as an alternate theory/' 
The words "new policy" are nowhere found in the complaint. While the 
complaint does cite to section 31 A-22-305(9)(b), the complaint alleges that Allstate 
should have provided the Casadays with UIM limits equal to their liability limits. 
(See R. 3 ,110; 4, f 12; 5, M 15-16.) Allstate denied this allegation. (R. 26, <f 10.) 
Thus, the issue of whether Allstate owed the Casadays UIM limits equal to their 
liability limits was joined.34 
The Casadays' theory was that Allstate should have equalized their UIM 
limits with their liability limits. That was the purpose of S.B. 189, the bill that 
enacted section 31 A-22-305(9). Subsection (b) of that! act applied to new policies, 
34
 See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 836 (6th ed. 1990) (an issue is 
joined when the parties "arrive at that stage . . . in their pleadings, that one 
asserts a fact (or a legal proposition) to be so, and the other denies it"). 
27 
and subsection (g) applied to renewal policies. The legislature's clear intent in 
passing the statute was to provide insureds UIM coverage equal to their liability 
coverage if they so desired, regardless of whether a policy was a new policy or a 
renewal policy.35 The gist of the plaintiffs' complaint was that, but for Allstate's 
failure to comply with the UIM statute, the Casadays would have had UIM 
coverage equal to their liability coverage under the UIM statute. Allstate neither 
obtained a signed waiver from the Casadays for the greater UIM coverage under 
subsection (b), nor did it give the Casadays the required notices under subsection 
(g) that would have allowed them to make an informed decision to purchase 
UIM coverage equal to their liability coverage. 
Allstate recognized early on—even before the Casadays filed suit—that it 
had a duty to comply with subsection (g), and it pleaded as much in its answer. 
The Casadays soon clarified, in response to Allstate's discovery requests, that, if 
See General Sec. Indem. Co. of Ariz. v. Tipton, 2007 UT App 109, % 11, 
158 P.3d 1121 ("What this bill [S.B. 189] does is says, when you're purchasing 
insurance . . . the underinsured coverage will be the same as the liability coverage 
you have, unless you choose not to take that. But what [the bill] presumes, is that 
the levels will be the same, so that the consumer gets what they believe they're 
buying, or they understand what they're buying . . . . " ) (footnote omitted) 
(quoting statement of Rep. Koehn in House floor debate on S.B. 189, 2000 Utah 
Leg., Gen. Sess. (Mar. 1, 2000)), cert, denied sub nom. Fulcrum v. Tipton, 168 P.3d 
819 (Utah 2007). 
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their policy was not considered a new policy, which it could have been if the 
Casadays had recently made changes to their policy,36 Allstate still had a duty to 
give them notice and an opportunity to purchase greater I JIM coverage under 
subsection (g). Allstate in fact provided such coverage for other insureds in the 
Casadays' position. 
There i<? r\o requirement thai a
 riaimin specificai,\ pieao a siaii.u ^u;a . 
than a staiuu - .; limitations or a private statute).37 1 "1 iiis if tl le Casada> s 1 tad left 
out the statutory reference ii i. paragrapl i 6 of tl ten con iplaii it ei itirely (tl le oi ily 
referei ice to sii bsectioi i (b)) 1:1 leii coi r iplai i it i v en ild still 1 lave stated a cla i m 
36
 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaneshiro, 998 \ .. ,\ 4Vu •• J.{. i lawan ^ • ) 
(changing the named insured and adding a vehicle to the policy made it a new 
policy); Millet v. Imperial Fire & Cas. Ins., 887 So.2d 603, 606 (La. Ct. App 2004) 
(addition of a car made a policy a new policy) (citing Daigle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 690 
So.2d 261, 262 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 693 So.2d 738 (La. 1997), writ denied, 893 
So.2d 882 (La 2005)); Dempsey v. Automotive Cas. Ins., 680 So.2d 675 (La. Ct. App. 
1996) (addition of another insured); Doyle v. Titan Indent. Co., 629 So.2d 516, 520 
(I ,a. Ct. App. 1993) (addition of another insured, new vehicle, or both); Ruiz v. 
Lewis, 579 So.2d 1203,1207 (I ,a. Ct. App.) (increase in liability coverage), writ 
denied, 586 So.2d 562 (La. 1991). Daigle, Dempsey, and Doyle have all been 
superseded by statute. See American Deposit Ins. Co. v. Myles, 783 So.2d I Ihl, j 289 
(I,a. 2001). See also Savant v. American Central Ins. Co., 725 So.2d 43, 47 i La. Ct. 
App. 1998) ("Ordinarily, when there are changes in the insurance policy which 
involve the addition of insureds or vehicles, the policy is a new policy which 
requires the executior <••!" r.^w I !M forms/') (citations omitted) writ denied 739 
So.2d 202 (I ,a. 1999). 
37 Q ; UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(1-1)^ - (r 
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against Allstate. Courts that have considered the issue have therefore concluded 
that a citation to the wrong statutory provision does not make a complaint 
defective. As long as a complaint puts the defendant on notice of a valid claim so 
that the defendant is not prejudiced by the erroneous citation and it is apparent 
from the complaint that the claim would be actionable under the correct statute, 
the complaint raises a good claim.38 The complaint "need not identify a legal 
E.g., Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Denny, 250 F. 
Supp. 2d 948, 952-53 (N.D. 111. 2003) (a complaint that cited to and relied on a 
statute relating only to single-employer pension plans was not fatally defective 
where the pension plan at issue was a multi-employer pension plan and the 
defendant was put on notice that the plaintiff was seeking liability under the 
correct statute); Ajax Tool Works, Inc. v. Can-Eng Mfg. Ltd., No. 01 C 5938, 2003 WL 
223187 (N.D. 111. 2003) (copy included in the addendum) (the defendant was not 
entitled to summary judgment where the complaint alleged that the defendant 
breached warranties under the Ontario Sale of Goods Act instead of under the 
United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods: ' I t is of no 
m o m e n t . . . that [plaintiff's] complaint identified the wrong statute as the basis 
for [its] claim, as long as [its] allegations gave notice of a legally sufficient claim 
and [it] brought the legal support for [its] claim to the district court's attention in 
[its] response to [defendant's] summary judgment motion. , , ,) (quoting Ryan v. 
Illinois Deft of Children & Earn. Sews., 185 F.3d 751, 764 (7th Cir. 1999)); Blakely v. 
United Sews. Auto. Ass'n, No. 99-1046-CIV-T-17F, 1999 WL 1053122, at *3 (M.D. 
Fla. 1999) (copy included in the addendum) (where the plaintiff cited to the 
wrong version of a statute, the court refused to dismiss the complaint because it 
was "apparent that Plaintiffs intended a cause of action under the [correct 
statute]"); Huss v. Green Spring Health Sew., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 400, 402 (D. Del. 
1998) ("Reference to the wrong statute . . . will be corrected by the court if it can 
determine the appropriate statute . . . from the complaint."); Roman v. City of 
Middletown Bd. ofEduc, No. CV065000318S, 2007 WL 866480, at *3 (Conn. Super. 
C t 2007) (copy included in the addendum) (declining to grant summary 
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theory, and specifying an incorrect theory is not fatal/' As one court has 
explained: 'Instead of asking whether the complaint points to the appropriate 
statute, a court should ask whether relief is possible under any set oi KK is that 
could be established consistent with the allegations/'40 
Here, as Allstate recognized, the plaintiffs were claiming tnat Aiisute 
should have given them coverage equa i \u ; \ KMr I I a m my coverage. (See R, 
3 i laintills ba>e ail loui u! |du n | , a uses of j , noi- <• . me allegation mat 
Defendant should have pro\ iaed higher .1:. u - I.I.... me annum , »..., :-a* * .. 
;•- .'iamtiirs anu expressly stated ii 1. tl u | MI- * .1 ; n \ =
 xi : • 
their policy vv a s a 1 ie\ v po l i cy ai id 1:1: 1.1 u . ^ r;• ;; • ;. . 
"i 11 idei si lbsectic 1 t { 1: ) • :)f sectioi 1 31 A-22-305(9) absei it a sigi led \ v ai\ er or becau se 
•ate d id 1 1 :)t gi\ e tl lei :i: 1. a fi ill ai id fail opp :)ii: 1 1.1 tit) !:<:: i i icrease 1:1: leir [ JIM 
CCTV erage u 1 ider subsectioi t. (g) tl t.e plaintiffs' con iplaint stated a claim agaii 1st 
\11 >1 ai e. 
judgment against a plaintiff based on her reference to the wrong statutes because 
"the facts plead[ed] in the Complaint do state a cause of action" under the correct 
statute). 
40
 Id. (citations omitted). 
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Allstate had adequate notice of the plaintiffs' claim and litigated it under 
both theories (subsection (b) and subsection (g)), so it was not prejudiced by the 
plaintiffs' citation to the wrong statute. The Allstate adjuster handling the 
Casadays' claim recognized that they had a potential claim for the higher UIM 
limits under subsection (g), even before they filed suit. (See R. 578:8-20; 583:3-9; 
335, at 14:19-25.) 
Allstate agreed that the issues in the case were "framed by the pleadings 
which are the plaintiffs complaint and our answer." (R. 844, at 5:17-19 (emphasis 
added).) Allstate's own answer asserts that the subsection (9)(g) "specifically 
applies/' that it is the "subject statute," and that it "directly governs" the UIM 
limits of the plaintiffs' policy. (See R. 25, 30 & 28.) The plaintiffs gave Allstate 
notice in the plaintiffs' responses to Allstate's requests for admission that they 
were relying on subsection (g). (See R. 463-64.) The parties engaged in extensive 
discovery, including expert discovery, on whether Allstate had in fact fully 
complied with subsection (g). (See, e.g., R. 278; 285; 295-300; 535-38; 578-91; 611-
12; 620-31; 638-42; 644; 667-69; 692; 696-700.) The plaintiffs testified in their 
depositions that, if Allstate had given them the notices required by subsection 
(g), they would have purchased the higher UIM coverage, to match their liability 
32 
coverage. (R. 545:12-546:8; 557:9-18; 558:8-11.) Allstate did not object to this line 
of discovery, V clearly had notice of the Casadays' claims. And it did not 
dispute that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Allstate sent 
the Casadays the two notices required by the UIM statute ior existing policies. 
Therefore, the trial court erred when it granted Allstate's motion for summary 
judgment.41 
II. 
r
 I' 11 i«!" I' I {II A I , U > U K T I i K KI ; , i ) V\ i J1 \ N I' I' I ) I ; N I H I ) ' I' H \i (" \ S A i >, \ I S" 
if . in>TI<>N I'I > \i,Tr:ii < >i< WIHNM TIIM H I D C M I ^ IT, 
Utah Rule of Civil I 'rocedi ire 59(e) al lc 1 >, s a party to file a ii Lotic i 11: : • alter or 
amend a jud^meni nni lain iliaii Ini days aller nifn, ol ilio (iitl^nitiil 'nul ia 
ii lotioi i cai i be i ised to rev erse a judgn iei it • :)i i el tear tl le argi u i tei its :1: ' " I 'he 
41
 ^diallerv. Roadside ////., nu.r i<L\ ..^\ zt >, jx>(> \\ on ih o 'oo) 
(' justice is not served by accepting a claim of variance from a party w ho a? all 
times has been in a position of knowing (he true state* ol facts.") (citation 
omitted). 
42 
<i,V J / / , />/• T S Y i i w / / r / . ; / ^ - ' ^ n ^ r f M ^ ; : ( • „ * > 0 i \ 2 d 3 l W , 3 1 0 
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grounds for altering or amending a judgment are those stated in rule 59 for 
granting a new trial,43 which include: 
(1) . . . [A]buse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the . . . decision, or 
that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law.44 
For the reasons stated in point I, supra, the trial court abused its discretion, 
went against the law, or made an error of law that prevented the Casadays from 
having any trial, much less a fair trial, when it held that the Casadays7 reference 
in their complaint to subsection (b) of section 31A-22-305(9) was fatal to their 
claims. The trial court therefore should have altered or amended its judgment to 
allow the plaintiffs' claims to be considered on their merits. 
43
 Id. at 311. 
44
 UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(a). 
34 
III. 
TI IE TRIA I , COURT ERRED BY NOT \LLOWING THE PLAIN I IFFS 
I O AMEN D THEIR COMPI AINT TO l ONTFORM TO TI IE "E\ 'IDENCE 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) authorizes the Court to conform the 
pleadings to the evidence, even after a judgment is entered: 
I V 1 ien issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or 
impl ied consen t of the pa r t i e s , they shall be treated in all respects as if 
they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as 
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these 
issues may be made upon motioii of any party at any time, even after 
judgment 
(Emphasis added.) 
Rule J .. •, applies to 11 lotioi is as v\< ell as to trials. 1:5 
u>\ ITS (u t« Mi iudoi i m '\ Ji'i h i ' leadings ma\ be a m e n d e d • 
( ni i lorn i In 11 iHi" evident < I I I < l i n e III*1 |\trli«\s h ied 111* issue lM, express or 
iiii| iliri I cu lm ni iinil n'i J i m IIM | "in lias (Iill 11 i| li"\ the issue b\ i l \ p r i s s u i 
implied u n i s e u l 11111 (ii)lli( pieM ndil n>n nl Ihe in in i l l s nl Ihe action is " s u b s e r v e d " 
"by an lendmei it ai id (1: ) the admissioi n of e\ idence oi it, tl ne issi le woi i Id i lot 
45
 , , ^ \ih ('it . \mg Island Savs. Bank FSB, 20 F. S u p p . 2d 535, 540 
ii.u {OAJ.f\ \ i ^9S) (apply ing rule 15(b) on a motion for summary judgment) 
(citations omened;. See also Deitz v. Bowman, 403 F. Supp. 1 111, 1112 13 (U.S. I) 
1975) (the rule may be invoked for evidentiary matters or when an issue of law is 
raised and argued). 
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prejudice the other party.46 Amendment is mandatory in the first situation and 
discretionary with the trial court in the second. In either case, a motion to 
conform the pleadings to the evidence should be permitted freely.47 
Consent to have an issue tried is implied when the issue has been litigated 
without objection during discovery and other pretrial proceedings.48 That is 
because 
a party who knowingly acquiesces in the introduction of evidence 
relating to issues that are beyond the pleadings is in no position to 
contest a motion to conform. Thus, consent generally is found when 
46
 See Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT App 243, %f 36-37,166 P.3d 639, 
cert denied, 186 P.3d 347 (Utah 2007). 
47
 E.g., In re Timberline Lodge, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 13,17 (D. Or. 1955) ("If 
the facts are such as to sustain the suggested additional allegations to remedy the 
defective pleading of [a statute]/ ' the movants should be granted leave to 
amend); Popovitch v. Kasperlik, 76 F. Supp. 233, 238 (W.D. Pa. 1947) ("If the 
plaintiff has a cause of action on any theory of law, he should be given leave to 
assert it"). 
48
 See 3 JAMES W M . MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 15.18[1], at 
15-89 (3d ed. 2008) (footnote omitted); Torry v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 399 F.3d 
876, 877-79 (7th Cir. 2005) (where the plaintiffs complaint only alleged age 
discrimination but "it quickly became apparent" in pretrial proceedings that she 
was also seeking a remedy for racial discrimination and the defendant did not 
object, "the issue of racial discrimination was (pre)tried by implied consent"); 
Kulkarni v. Alexander, 662 F.2d 758, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (where the plaintiff raised 
an unpleaded issue in the course of his presentation on cross-motions for 
summary judgment and both the court and the defendant were adequately 
alerted to his position on the issue and did not claim surprise, the issue was tried 
by implied consent). 
36 
evidence is introduced without objection, or when the party 
opposing the motion to amend actually produced evidence bearing 
on the new' issue.49 
Here, the parties impliedly, if not expressly, consented to try the 
applicability of section 31 A-22-305(9)(g). -\ •. •». >. * - ...-.;•. * .... \i ^  answer that 
section 31A-22-305(9)(g) "specifically applies in lieu of Subsection 9(1: >) (R 25 1 
6) and raised its compliance with section ,>L\ _. >Ui>(9)(g) as an affirmative 
defense (R. 28 & 30). In response to . Aistale s u ; \ first requests for admissioi w. 
the plaintiffs admitted that subsection (g) applied i • u -;. nJcu i,:.a \. i ..;. •., • 
complied v\in. *;. ^ligations undci SUL)M\IKMIL;J. p c i\. -HV. *H ; - - ,• i-rii tYs 
asked Allstate in discovery wl lei i it becan i..e a\ \M. ^; •• im, . i • ^ 
disclosures to polic> 1 loldei s i n idei subsectioi i.. (g), ai t :1 Ulstate responded tl ia.1: it 
"first gave nulla1 nl tin- ,'IIHI I 111\ I Ian lo Rti\ niniiiK asada\ on \|»iil I, I ,'"H(»! ' 
(R 692.) AJ 1 state prodi iced doa m Lei its 1:1 tat rai sed fact i tal issues as to v\ hetl ler 
t \ II sta/i e l L MI i < HI if >.! i< >< 1 "\ \ ii 1 i si il >s< >< :t u »i i (g) (Si \el ! 6111 1 2; 644; 667-69 ) B< :»! 1 i 
pai ties experts add ressed tl: le applicability of si ibsectioi t. (g) (See R 474:, 480-81 ; 
con Lplied v dtl i tl: te reqi liremei its oi ' si ibsectioi t (g) (See R 545:1 546:8; 554:1-
49
 ... v tw] I A K L E S A L A N W \<K .I rr n AI ... I N D E R A L P R A C T I C E A N D 
PRC )( :EI )I IRE S 1491 a t 2 4 - 2 8 (2d *>d. 1990) . 
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556:12; 557:1-22; 558:8-16; 559:6-561:15.) And Allstate allowed its employees to 
testify at length about whether or not it complied with subsection (g), without 
any objection that the information was irrelevant because it was beyond the 
scope of the pleadings. (R. 577:21-579:12; 580:9-581:7; 583:1-19; 584:24-585:19; 
586:20-588:5; 589:8-591:4; 593:19-594:23; 617:2-619:17; 620:16-621:25; 622:19-630:1; 
638:2-642:9; 696:3-700:2.) The parties and the court (see R. 335, at 22:16-22) clearly 
understood that Allstate's compliance with subsection (g) was an issue in the 
case. In fact, Allstate's own expert testified that, "if you're asking me whether or 
not the claims at this point are sufficiently developed, that the case will be tried 
on all these theories [subsection (g) as well as subsection (b)], [the answer is] of 
course/' (R. 564:7-10 (emphasis added).) 
It is not an abuse of discretion to allow an amendment to conform to the 
evidence if it raises "an issue not inconsistent with the position taken by the non-
moving party earlier in the proceedings."50 Allstate took the position in its 
pleadings and in discovery that subsection (g) applied (and that it had complied 
with subsection (g)). It at least impliedly consented to have those issues tried. 
Under these circumstances, an amendment of the pleadings to conform to the 
Baker v. John Morrell & Co., 382 F.3d 816, 831 (8th Cir. 2004). 
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evidence produced and the theories elucidated through discovery was 
mandatory. 
The presentation of the merits of the action will clearly be subserved by 
amendment. Allstate has taken the position from the time it filed its answer that 
the Casadays' claims were governed by subsection (g), yet the Court's ruling 
avoided the merits of that claim. 
Mlowing the parties to litigate the merits <A tho c asaciaysJ" claims under 
subsection (g) would not prejudice Allstate because Allstate has recognized the 
applicability of subsection (g) from \\u Lvgmmn;-. o; IL , acuon. ana HA- parties 
condiu ux\ discovery on .nstate's compliance w ith subsection (g). I" \k) adc:;i 
discovery is necessary. Admittedly,,,/ Vlistate i v oi ild lose tl ic sun 1:1:1 lai y j i idg i 1 Lei i:l: 
it has obtained ai id w ould 1 i..a\ e to try 1:1 te Casadays' clain is 01 11:1 i.ei.1 1 1 ler i ts I: 1 it 
I lull is not flu soi I nl p n i | i u l i u • 1 ill1 I' i(h) is i in MI 11 I. ' pi ven t . 5 1 
51
 SrcbA WKIGINTI ... .. ,upranote49f§ 1494, at 3," 1 tlu obKvtaiu 
pai'U rr.ust be put to some serious disadvantage; it is not enough that the partv 
. . . seeks to protect some tactical advantage"); 3 MOORE, supra note 48, § 15.18[2], 
at 15-94 ("the opposing party is not prejudiced by evidence that only presents a 
new legal theory, but is based on the facts and circumstances constituting the 
(|
 l i n lc iimadv set ^^ •'" '^^ ^^amended pleadings") (footnote omitted) 
39 
In Deitz v. Bowman, for example, the defendant raised the statute of 
limitations as a defense in its answer but cited to an inapplicable statute of 
limitations. The court applied the correct statute of limitations, which was not 
raised by pleading or motion, where the plaintiff was made aware of the issue at 
a pretrial conference. The court concluded that the answer adequately raised the 
statute of limitations as a defense when it cited a different, inapplicable statute.53 
Similarly, in Kirk v. United States,5* the court held that it was an abuse of 
discretion to deny the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to conform to the 
defendant's discovery responses, which raised the defense of workers7 
compensation immunity, a defense that had not been pleaded. The court 
concluded that the plaintiff should have been allowed to amend the complaint to 
allege facts that would have taken the defendant out of the protections of the 
workers' compensation act: 
For the court to say: No, you pleaded it that way the first time 
and although it is admitted by the defendant that the facts are 
otherwise, yet you will be held to your original allegation, seems to 
403 F. Supp. 1111 (D.S.D. 1975). 
Id. at 1113. 
232 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1956). 
40 
u- to be wholly unwarranted and a ruling operating to avoid 
ascertaining the true facts in the case. 55 
The Kirk court relied in part on Rossiter v. Vogel,56 where "it was held error for the 
court to proceed to enter a summary judgment after [a] showing had been made 
which would justify an amendment of the pleadings/'57 
Similarly, in this case the plaintiffs' responses to the delendani - requests 
for admissions clearly show u««n \iw piamtills were relying on subsection (g) oi 
tin.- i.|j\4 statute, and discovery confirmed their reliance on tin ^uituie i he tnai 
court therefore erred b\ nui .nio A m^ die pleadings to t e anKi ,:oo i i; 3 
the evidence. 
55
 i 1 • i ; 1.1 : 7 0 
56
 134 F.2d 908, 912 (2d Cir. 1943). 
57
 2 3 2 F . 2 d < if •: : : 
58
 / ^ rkloum Med, uu>., nit. . . Penile*, 948 I 2d 84, b9 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(the court muM "look to the totality of the complaint as well as the course of 
proceedings to determine whether the defendant weie -mvided with sufficient 
notice" of a claim) feniph isis added). 
41 
Rule 15(b) specifically applies where a plaintiff sues under one statutory 
provision but is entitled to relief under another.59 In Scott,60 for example, the 
plaintiff, a railroad brakeman who was injured when he was thrown from the 
caboose of a train, recovered under the Boiler Inspection Act, even though his 
complaint did not mention the Boiler Inspection Act and did not include a 
statutory citation to the act (although it did cite to the Safety Appliance Acts, of 
which the Boiler Inspection Act was a part). The defendant appealed on the 
grounds that the plaintiffs proof did not correspond with the pleadings. The 
court rejected the argument: "This argument stems from a mere technical failure 
to make a citation in the complaint broad enough/'61 The fact that the plaintiff 
had pleaded a specific defect that was not borne out by the proof was not fatal: 
"That a far more specific allegation of the complaint . . . was never substantiated 
by any offer of proof whatsoever, neither indicates abandonment of one theory of 
liability for another nor does it preclude the plaintiff from showing other 
59
 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 1493, at 48-50; Cameron v. Federal 
Auto Parts, Inc., 301 F.2d 867, 869 (5th Cir. 1962); Scott v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 151 
F.2d 61, 63-64 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1945). 
60
 151 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1945). 
61
 Id. at 63 (footnote omitted). 
42 
defects/'62 The court concluded: "We may assume that plaintiff started his 
action on one theory which his proof did not support. Then the proof 
sustained recovery on another ground , . , [T]hi- pleadings coimi tik-n ho 
amended to conform to the proof 
'^miiarh, in this ca.^ e (he Casadays cited ;• ;... * \i statute but i lot to 
subsection (g; o\ the statute, even though the proof supported a claim... under 
subsection (g). " I he district con i t should 1 lave allowed tl ten t. to an lei id tl tell 
complaint to conforii t. to tl le e\ idei ice de\ eloped ii i di sco\ ery 1 1 ie fact tl tat 1:1 i EI 
Casadays did i lot fori r i..a.J ly seekleav e to ai nei id to coi if : xn t. to tl ie e\ id ence i i i iti 1 
after" tl i.e ti ial coi n 11 i.a.d. gr ai ited \llstate s n totioi i for si u i imar > ji idgn i.ei it is i t. : t 
fatal, sir ice ai i.. an iei idn lei it tc coi if o n i t. to 1:1. ie e v idence '' i nay' be n lade i lpon 
n i.oti.01 1. of ai t ; > part y at ai ry tin ie evei t. after ji idgr i ient / / b 1 
62
 hi a I 64. 
63 
64
 U I AI i R. v J \ A \ i .>dv See also, e.g., Proctor v. Gissendaner, 579 F.2d 
876, 885 n.20 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The fact that no formal amendment of the 
pleadings took place | before judgment] is of no consequence."), supplemented, 587 
F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 197V), nvernilrd -\n other grounds by Affholder, Inc. v. Southern 
Rock, !ru., 746 F.2ri W ( 5I1M. = i • i;, Mendoza v. City of Rome, 872 F. Supp. 1110, 
1125 (N.DA'A. 1994) ^'The court may allow amendment of the pleadings to 
conform to the evidence even when a motion to do so is made after judgment") 
(citations omitted). 
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No great amendment was needed. The plaintiffs could have simply 
deleted the statutory reference and any reference to when the policy was issued. 
The trial court erred by not allowing them to do so. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING THE CAS AD AYS 
TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) allows a party to amend a complaint 
with leave of court and further provides that "leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires/' "The pleadings are never more important than the case that 
is before the Court."65 The trial court erred by not allowing the Casadays to 
amend their complaint under the circumstances. 
The factors Utah courts consider in granting leave to amend under rule 
15(a) include (1) the timeliness of the motion, (2) the justification given by the 
movant for the delay, and (3) any resulting prejudice to the responding party.66 
65
 Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Prods., Inc., 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 
P.2d 446, 449-50 (1973) (quoting the trial court in that case with approval). 
66
 See Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, f 26, 87 P.3d 
734 (citations omitted). 
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As to timeliness, ''Utah appellate courts have consistently refused the 
invitation to establish a bright line rule regarding how far info the litigation 
process a motion to amend must be filed in order to be deemed untinh h 
Admittedly the Casadays' motion to amend their complaint under rule * v« ? 
could nnly have been granted if the trial court set aside the summary fLiclgment.68 
For the reasons stated in point li, supra, however, the trial court erred by not 
setting aside the summary judgment.69 Had \\w ,i uii c; .;;; done so, the 
procedural posture of the case wouus ;uu* uiangea,a. . !u •( asanas "...-at* 
would have been timely. 
\:-> U) :>.* j U M i i h a u o i ; : • ., . a »ti -. j I V I n i i ; t . < •*» -i- .-i . - S 
have focused oi t tl: le party s pi Ioi ki 10 w ledge of tl i.e proposed an lei idn t.ei it ai id 
whellirt lis drla\ n a s l l h irsull < il had ladli Whan 'lilt paih, 'i|iii< 
I1 Hi MA l e d g r Will,1! l n i f l i n i a l , Him v l n ' h " ill \ \ , i : , k i 'i I n i l i l i s p i i l u u s nil 11 in n u n I I I M U 1 
c\ idem (\ the pai l\' s dei IM< »i i h In ilil i ill i MI | flraditi;; those alle^alun r. in ill I 
67
 / % 28. 
68
 ice National Advertising I a. ,. A a/ana/ LJII/ ^.urp., zuvn u i . \pp . a, ;i 
i.), iai J'.od S72 (citing Combs v. Price Waterhouse Coopers, 382 1: \i Mu'* I ^0^ 
(loih (*ir. ?n(U r.,
 a T j . demed, 138 P.3d 589 (Utah 2006) 
69
 Cf. Fomait. > i t 'a ai i;v {i\ *vas error to deny a petition to vacate a 
judgna i){ to allow amendment ot the complaint where the amendment would 
have don.- ni*» ni in- than state an alternative theory of recovery). 
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reliable confirmation could be obtained should not serve as grounds for 
procedural default/'70 Here, plaintiffs' counsel did not act from a dilatory motive 
or bad faith. Plaintiffs' counsel originally thought that the Casadays' policy 
would be considered a new policy because of changes to the policy. When it 
became apparent through discovery that it would be considered a renewal policy 
and that subsection (g) governed, plaintiffs' counsel thought that the complaint 
was pleaded sufficiently broadly to include that claim. Even the trial court 
concluded that the complaint was, "indeed, vague with respect to whether the 
reference is to a 'new' or 'existing' policy." (R. 720.) The Casadays did not 
receive a key document going to the subsection (g) issue until after the time for 
amending the pleadings had passed and after the discovery cutoff date. {See, e.g., 
R. 85-89.) The Casadays then asked the court to extend the time for amending 
the pleadings (R. 90-91), but the court denied the request {see R. 335, at 31:12-
33:19). 
Finally, as to prejudice, "a showing of simple prejudice is not enough to 
support a denial of a motion to amend."71 "'[Ajlmost every amendment of a 
Kelly, 2004 UT App 44, \ 38. 
Id. 131. 
46 
pleading will result in some ''practical prejudice" to the opposing party.' A 
motion to amend should be denied "onI\ WIKMV Ilie opposing side would be put 
to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for whu n ne luu ,,<>/ unit .<> 
prepare/"73 
\ 1 |he fact that an amended pudding may require the defendant to 
conduct additional discovery does not, alone, constitute sufficient 
grounds to justify the denial of a motion to amend. In determining 
whether the amendment will cause prejudice, the court's inquiry 
should center on whether the nonmoving; pnrtv has a fair 
opport i inity to litigate the new issi le.. 
Here, Allstate 1 lad i lotice of 1:1 t.e applicabil ity of si :i bsectioi t. (g) fr 311 t. e v ei i before 
tl t.e beginnii i,g of tl i:is case 1: tad ai t. oppoi 1: i; u lit y tc • take discover \ oi i tl le i ssi le and 
ii i fact condi icted ai id provided fi ill discos ^ ei > oi it. tl te issi i.e ,IX Jo addi t io i tal 
discovery v\ as i leeded t \ Ustate woi lid tl lerefore i lot be prejudiced by ai i 
ai i lendmei it to alio \t tl t.e plaii iti ffs' claims to be 1 itigated 1 11 ider si ibsection (g). 
Becau se Allstate \ \ 01 1 Id 1 iot be j: >reji idiced by the proposed amendment and. 
n •, plaint if"! did not act in bad faith in not moving to amend earlier, the trial 
/.:' (quoting ol A Am. lur :,c Pleading § 776 (200o) (emphasis added)). 
3
 in ^ juo t ing Kasco bcu*. c orr. ,K />, n M „. : 0 l \Ai Js(-. l>2 ( I J ! -ah 1 992) 
- i add»*d , f 'd in terna l nnotnh^n^ ,«n^ rH »HIM^ •niif!(^^ 
4
 Id. (qiK)ting 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading § 777 (2003)). 
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court should have "freely given" the Casadays leave to amend their complaint, 
"as the rules require."75 The trial court erred by not doing so. 
CONCLUSION 
Allstate had notice that the Casadays were claiming that Allstate should 
have provided them with UIM limits equal to their liability limits under Utah's 
UIM statute, and it had an opportunity to meet that claim. The trial court 
therefore erred when it concluded that the Casadays' citation to the wrong sub-
subsection of Utah's UIM statute precluded their claims from being considered 
on their merits. Utah rules, like their federal counterparts, express a policy "of 
having the issues decided on the merits."76 The trial court's reliance on a 
reference to a sub-subsection of the UIM statute that ultimately proved 
inapplicable in order to avoid reaching the merits of the Casadays' claims 
"improperly place[d] too much emphasis on achieving a final, as opposed to a 
complete, adjudication of the controversy."77 The Court should therefore reverse 
75
 See id. % 41 (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,182 (1962)). 
76
 3 MOORE, supra note 48, § 15.18[2], at 51. See also UTAH R. CIV. P. 1(a) 
(the rules of civil procedure "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action"). 
77
 See 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, § 1494, at 55. 
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the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand this case for 
consideration of the Casadays' claims on their merits, amending their complaint 
if necessary to conform to the evidence adduced in the pretrial proceedings. 
DATED this day of 14th day of September, 2009, 
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN 
David R. Olsen 
Paul M. Simmdns 
John C. Hansen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
(Original signature) 
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ADDENDUM 
51 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9) (2001) 
( 9 ) . . . 
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the 
limits of underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser 
of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the 
maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits available by the 
insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy, unless the insured 
purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an 
acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that: 
(i) waives the higher coverage; 
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist 
coverage; and 
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase 
underinsured motorist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the 
limits of the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the 
maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits available by the 
insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(f)(i) A named insured may reject underinsured motorist 
coverage by an express writing to the insurer that provides liability 
coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a). 
(ii) This written rejection shall be on a form provided by the 
insurer that includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of 
underinsured motorist coverage and when it would be applicable. 
(iii) This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability 
coverage until the insured in writing requests underinsured motorist 
coverage from that liability insurer. 
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(g)(i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent 
after January 1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer 
shall disclose in the same medium as the preraium renewal notice, 
an explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage 
and the costs associated with increasing the coverage in amounts up 
to and including the maximum amount available by the insurer 
under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry 
underinsured motorist coverage limits in an amount less than the 
insured's motor vehicle liability policy limits or the maximum 
underinsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer 
under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for 
relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-
party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for 
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in 
the alternative or of several different types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and 
plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or 
deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies. If he is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to 
the truth of an averment, he shall so state and this has the effect of a 
denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the averments 
denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or 
a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is 
true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the 
pleader intends in good faith to controvert all the averments of the 
preceding pleading, he may make his denials as specific denials of 
designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all 
the averments except such designated averments or paragraphs as 
he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend to controvert all its 
averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the obligations 
set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a 
party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration 
and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in 
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, 
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, 
res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any 
other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When 
a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a 
counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, 
shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
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(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in p pleading to which a 
responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of 
damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. 
Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is 
required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
(e)(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, 
and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are required. 
(e)(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim 
or defense alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or 
defense or in separate counts or defenses. When two or more 
statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made 
independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made 
insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative 
statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or 
defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on 
legal or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be 
made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so 
construed as to do substantial justice. 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a 
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served 
or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is 
permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, 
he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. 
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or 
by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an 
amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the 
original pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended 
pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court 
otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not 
raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised 
in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as may be 
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise 
these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, 
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial 
on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, 
the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when the 
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby 
and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or 
defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is 
sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or 
any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda 
and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character^ may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59, New trials; amendments of judgment 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial 
may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the 
issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a 
motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may 
open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional 
testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make 
new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or 
adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by 
which either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more 
of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special 
verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the 
court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a result of bribery, 
such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the 
jurors. 
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could 
not have guarded against. 
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party 
making the application, which he could not, with reasonable 
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have 
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or 
other decision, or that it is against law. 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
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(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or 
amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after 
entry of the judgment. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIJ 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 01 UTAH 1 M „ oftttV^ft 
RAYMOND E. CASADAY and ELLEN 
CASADAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
COUB 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 060916782 
Hon. JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. 
January 9, 2 009 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court heard oral 
argument with respect to the motion on December 16, 2009. 
Following the hearing, the matter was taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits 
attached thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
In support of its motion, Allstate Insurance Company, 
("Allstate") notes Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that they had a 
"new policy" in 2 001, that they never signed a waiver of 
underinsured motorist coverage, and that Allstate therefore 
failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305 (9) (b) . 
According to Allstate, all claims and all theories of recovery 
stated in Plaintiffs' Complaint stem from the alleged violation 
of this specific statute. However, argues Allstate, in the 
memoranda submitted by both parties related to this Motion for 
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Summary Judgment, no dispute exists that Plaintiffs' insurance 
policy was in fact an "existing" policy and not a "new" policy as 
alleged by Plaintiffs. In fact, asserts Allstate, Plaintiffs 
have specifically stated that they "concede that their policy 
would likely be considered as an existing policy, rather than a 
new policy. . . . " 
The aforementioned in mind, Allstate argues Utah appellate 
law unequivocally states that Plaintiffs' failure to include 
claims and grounds for such claims in their Complaint precludes 
this Court from addressing such claims in Defendant's Motion for 
Summary judgment. Finally, as to Plaintiff's arguments regarding 
SB189, Allstate asserts the Court may not consider such argument 
because Defendant did not raise the issue in its summary judgment 
motion and further because the Complaint failed to raise SB189 as 
an issue in this case. 
Plaintiffs oppose the motion arguing Allstate has had notice 
and an opportunity to defend each of the claims which have been 
made by the Plaintiffs in this case. Indeed, assert Plaintiffs, 
it is clear in their Complaint that they have alleged that 
Allstate should have provided them with UIM limits in the amount 
of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. Not only, 
contend Plaintiffs, are these allegations "simple, concise and 
direct," as required by Rule 8(e) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure, but they should be "liberally donstrued," in 
accordance with Rule 1(a), in order to promote justice. 
Moreover, argue Plaintiffs, since Allstate's Motion is 
limited to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(b) and does not even 
begin to address subsection (h), which has been at issue in this 
case since the beginning and concerning which there are numerous 
disputed issues of material fact, summary judgment should be 
denied by this Court. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9): 
(a) Underinsured motorist coverage under 
Subsection 31A-22-302(1) (c) provides coverage 
for covered persons who are legally entitled 
to recover damages from owners or operators 
of underinsured motor vehicles because of 
bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death. 
(b) For new policies written)on or after 
January 1, 2001, the limits of underinsured 
motorist coverage shall be equal to the 
lesser of the limits of the insured's motor 
vehicle liability coverage or the maximum 
underinsured motorist coverage limits 
available by the insurer under the insured's 
motor vehicle policy, unless uhe insured 
purchases coverage in a lesser pount by 
signing an acknowledgment form provided by 
the insurer that: 
(i) waives the higher coverage; 
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of 
underinsured motorist coverage; and 
(iii) discloses the additional premiums 
required to purchase underinsured motorist 
coverage with limits equal to tjie lesser of 
the limits of the insured's motbr vehicle 
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liability coverage or the maximum 
underinsured motorist coverage limits 
available by the insurer under the insured's 
motor vehicle policy. 
(c) Underinsured motorist coverage may not 
be sold with limits that are less than 
$10,00 0 for one person in any one accident 
and at least $20,000 for two or more persons 
in any one accident. 
(d) The acknowledgment under Subsection 
(9)(b) continues for that issuer of the 
underinsured motorist coverage until the 
insured, in writing, requests different 
underinsured motorist coverage from the 
insurer. 
(e) The nan^d insured's underinsured 
motorist covercige, as described in Subsection 
(9) (a), is secondary to the liability 
coverage of an owner or operator of an 
underinsured motor vehicle, as described in 
Subsection (8). Underinsured motorist 
coverage may not be set off against the 
liability coverage of the owner or operator 
of an underinsured motor vehicle, but shall 
be added to, combined with, or stacked upon 
the liability coverage of the owner or 
operator of the underinsured motor vehicle to 
determine the limit of coverage available to 
the injured person. 
(f) (i) A named insured may reject 
underinsured motorist coverage by an express 
writing to the insurer that provides 
liability coverage under Subsection 
31A-22-302(1) (a) . 
(ii) This written rejection shall be on 
a form provided by the insurer that includes 
a reasonable explanation of the purpose of 
underinsured motorist coverage and when it 
would be applicable. 
(iii) This rejection continues for that 
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issuer of the liability coverage until the 
insured in writing requests underinsured 
motorist coverage from that liability 
insurer. 
(g) (i) In conjunction with the first two 
renewal notices sent after January 1, 2 001, 
for policies existing on that date, the 
insurer shall disclose in the same medium as 
the premium renewal notice, an explanation of 
the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage 
and the costs associated with increasing the 
coverage in amounts up to and including the 
maximum amount available by the insurer under 
the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to 
all insureds that carry underinsured motorist 
coverage limits in an amount less than the 
insured's motor vehicle liability policy 
limits or the maximum underinsured motorist 
coverage limits available by the insurer 
under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305 (2001). 
In support of their position, Plaintiffs point to Paragraph 
12 of their Complaint which states: 
In violation of Utah law and contrary to the 
facts, defendant advised plaintiffs that 
their policy of insurance only provided under 
insured motorist coverage in the amount of 
$10,000, up to $20,000 per occurrence. 
Plaintiffs further cite to Paragraph 15 of their Complaint which 
states: 
The defendant refused to pay the limits of 
underinsured motorist coverage. . . required 
by law. 
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While, indeed, vague with respect to whether the reference 
is to a "new" or "existing" policy, it is important to note that 
in other portions of their Complaint, Plaintiffs1 specifically 
reference Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9)(b), which addresses 
"new" policies only. Absolutely no reference is specifically 
made to subsection (g) ("existing policies")- which Plaintiffs 
concede should properly apply. 
The aforementioned in mind, the Utah Court of Appeals stated 
the following in Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Jns. Exch. , 2008 
UT App 315, 193 P.3d 650 (Utah Ct. App. 2008): 
"A plaintiff is required, under our liberal 
standard of notice pleading, to submit a 
1
 short and plain statement . . . showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief1 and fa 
demand for judgment for the relief.1" 
Canfield v. Layton City, 2005 UT 60, P 14, 
122 P.3d 622 (omission in original) (quoting 
Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a) (1)-(2)) . Although "[t]he 
plaintiff must only give the defendant 'fair 
notice of the nature and basis or grounds of 
the claim and a general indication of the 
type of litigation involved,'" id. (quoting 
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 
966, 97L (Utah 1982)), it must do at least 
that much, see Harper v. Evans, 2 0 08 UT App 
165, P 13, 185 P.3d 573. 
Id. at P18. 
Applying the aforementioned to the facts of this case, the 
Court finds Plaintiffs' argument is directly contrary to their 
previous position and no attempt was made to even suggest the 
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issue as an alternate theory. Consequently, Allstate did not 
have adequate notice and the issue is not properly before the 
Court. Moreover, it should be noted that Plaintiffs have made no 
request to amend their Complaint. 
Based upon the forgoing, Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. 
DATED this if day of January, 2 009. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 060916782 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail LYNN S DAVIES 
Attorney DEF 
2 99 S MAIN 15TH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail DAVID R OLSEN 
Attorney PLA 
36 S STATE ST STE 2400 
KEY BANK TOWER 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84111-0024 
Dated this ^\ day of \(if\ 20 
Depttfy Court Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF \imM^ %" f^  
THIRD DISTRICT UUUR 
S^T LAKE DEPARTMENT 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 060916782 
Hon. JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. 
April 1, 2009 
RAYMOND E. CASADAY and ELLEN 
CASADAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. The Court heard 
oral argument with respect to the motion op. March 19, 2009. 
Following the hearing, the matter was taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motion and memoranda and for 
the good cause shown, hereby enters the following ruling. 
With this motion, Plaintiffs argue the Court erred when it 
concluded that Plaintiffs' citation to the wrong subsection of 
Utah's UIM statute precluded their claims from being considered 
on their merits. According to Plaintiffs, Rule 15(b) expresses a 
policy "of having the issues decided on the merits." It is 
Plaintiffs' position that Defendant's reliance on a reference to 
a subsection of the UIM statute that ultimately proved 
inapplicable in order to avoid reaching thje merits of the 
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Plaintiffs' claims improperly places too much emphasis on 
achieving a final, as opposed to a complete, adjudication of the 
controversy. The Court should therefore, contend Plaintiffs, 
amend its judgment to deny Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, allow Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint to conform to 
the evidence produced in the pretrial proceedings under Rule 
15(b) or, in the alternative, grant the Plaintiffs leave to amend 
under Rule 15 (a) so that their claims against Defendant can be 
considered on their merits. 
Defendant opposes the motion arguing Plaintiffs should not 
be allowed to alter or amend the judgment entered in this case as 
their arguments simply re-state previous arguments they made and 
which arguments this Court has already considered and rejected. 
Additionally, asserts Defendant, Plaintiff's motion, to conform 
the pleadings to the evidence only applies after a trial, not a 
summary judgment motion as was had in the present. Moreover, 
argues Defendant, at no time did it consent, expressly or by 
implication, to trial or any form of submission to the Court, of 
the substance or merits of the new claims now proposed by 
Plaintiffs. Finally, contends Defendant, this Court should deny 
Plaintiffs' request to amend based on the untimely and 
prejudicial nature of such a request. 
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that Allstate acted 
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in bad faith because if failed to acknowledge that the insurance 
policy in question was a new policy. However, when they 
subsequently determined that the policy was not a new policy 
after all, Plaintiffs attempted, without amending their Complaint 
or claiming it was an alternate theory, to allege that subsection 
(g) of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9), which addresses existing 
policies, was always their intended argumeht. Importantly, this 
argument of Plaintiffs sits against the backdrop of Defendant's 
consistently maintaining that the Complaintt did not even contain 
any allegations that would support a cause of action under 
subsection ug." 
With this factual basis and given Plaintiffs' failure to 
support any claim under subsection "g" and only specifically 
reference subsection ub," the Court turned to the Utah Court of 
Appeals case of Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch. , 2008 
UT App 315, 193 P.3d 650 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) in which the 
following was stated: 
"A plaintiff is required, under our liberal 
standard of notice pleading, to submit a 
'short and plain statement . . .showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief and !a 
demand for judgment for the relief.1" 
Canfield v. Layton City, 2005 UT 60, P 14, 
122 P.3d 622 (omission in original) (quoting 
Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a) (1)- (2)) . Although »[t]he 
plaintiff must only give the defendant 'fair 
notice of the nature and basis o^r grounds of 
the claim and a general indication of the 
type of litigation involved,'" id, (quoting 
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Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 
966, 971 (Utah 1982)), it must do at least 
that much, see Harper v. Evans, 2 00 8 UT App 
165, P 13, 185 P.3d 573. 
Id. at P18. 
Applying the aforementioned to the facts of this case, the 
Court found Plaintiffs1 argument was directly contrary to their 
previous position and given that no attempt was made to amend or 
even suggest the issue as an alternate theory, Allstate did not 
have adequate notice, making summary judgment appropriate. 
With this motion, Plaintiffs now attempt, after the deadline 
for fact discovery has passed, and after summary judgment has 
been entered, to shift to a new theory in an effort to obtain a 
ruling in their favor. This said, however, Plaintiffs do so 
without distinguishing the Asael case, and without meeting the 
requirements for relief under either Rules 59(e), 15(a), or 
15(b). Even if the Court were to overlook the procedural 
requirements of these Rules and broadly treat this as a motion 
for reconsideration, amendment of the Complaint would be 
necessary before such reconsideration would even b€* appropriate. 
Indeed, it is this necessity for amendment which only further 
highlights the applicability of the Asael case and demonstrates 
the appropriateness of the summary judgment entered in this 
matter. 
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Based upon the forgoing, Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment is, respectfully, denied. 
DATED this J^ day of April, 2 009 
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I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 060916782 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: LYNN S DAVIES 299 S MAIN 15TH FLOOR SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
MAIL: DAVID R OLSEN 36 S STATE ST STE 2400 KEY BANK TOWER SALT 
LAKE CITY UT 84111-0024 
Date: 4f\\cf^ ^£V 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Westlaw. 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2003 WL 223187 (N.D.lll.), Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 16,51 6 
(Cite as: 2003 WL 223187 (N.D.lll.)) 
Pa^e 1 
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern 
Division. 
AJAX TOOL WORKS, INC., Plaintiff, 
v. 
CAN-ENG MANUFACTURING LTD., Defendant. 
No. 01 C 5938. 
Jan. 30, 2003. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
HOLDEKMAK J. 
*1 On March 15, 2002, plaintiff Ajax Tool Works, Inc. 
("Ajax") filed a four-count first amended complaint 
agamst Can-Eng Manufacturing Ltd. ("Can-Eng") alleging 
breach of express and implied warranties and breach of 
contract. On December 23, 2002, Can-Eng moved, 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, for 
summary judgment. Having considered this matter fully, 
for the reasons stated herein, Can-Eng's motion for 
summary judgment is denied in part and granted in part. 
STA TEMENT OF FA CTSP& 
FN1. The facts assumed to be true for purposes 
of this summary judgment motion are derived 
from Can-Eng's Local Rule 56.1 (a) Statement of 
Facts, Ajax's Local Rule 56.1(b) Statement of 
Additional Facts and Response, and Can-Eng's 
Response to Ajax's Statement of Additional 
Facts. 
Plaintiff Ajax, an Illinois coiporation, is a manufacturer of 
chisels, hammers, and other tools. Defendant Can-Eng, an 
Ontario, Canada corporation, manufactures industrial 
furnaces, including a fluidized bed furnace, which is at 
issue in this case. In January 1996, at the request of 
Lindberg Technical and Management Services, a 
consulting firm retained by Ajax, Can-Eng submitted a 
proposal in which it offered to supply a fluidized bed 
furnace to Ajax. Ajax did not accept this offer. Over the 
course of 1996L Can-Eng submitted two follow-up 
proposals to Ajax, neither of which was accepted. On 
January 27,1997, Can-Eng sent Ajax a fourth proposal to 
sell a fluidized bed furnace to Ajax for $90,000. After 
issuance of the proposal, the parties entered into an 
agreement whereby Ajax purchased the furnace from 
Can-Eng. The terms of the January 27, 1997, proposal 
formed the parties' contract— 
FN2. In its memorandum in opposition to 
summary judgment, Ajax disputes that it 
accepted Can-Eng's January 27,1997, proposal. 
It argues that it made a counteroffer that 
Can-Eng accepted on January 24,1997, and that 
it never executed the contract containing the 
terms in dispute. la its first amended complaint, 
however, Ajax alleges: "Following issuance of 
the [January 27, 1997 (Compl. common 
allegations f 8, Counts III and 1Y ] 8) ] Proposal, 
Plaintiff and Defendant contracted for the 
purchase and sale of [the furnace]...." (Compl. 
common allegations f 10, Counts III and IV f 
11.) Ajax has thereby judicially admitted that the 
parties entered into a contract after Januaiy 27, 
1997. See Son Line R. Co v. St. Louis 
Southwestern Rv. Co.. 125 F 3d 48L 483 (7th 
Cir.1997) (holding that at summary judgment 
"judicial efficiency demands that a party not be 
allowed to controvert what it has already 
unequivocally told a court by the most formal 
and considered means possible."); Keller v U.S.. 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2003 WL 223187 (N.D.llL), 
(Cite as: 2003 WL 223187 (N.D.llL)) 
58 F.3d 1104. 1198 ii 8 (7th Cir. 19Q5) ("Judicial 
admissions are formal concessions in the 
pleadings, or stipulations by a parly or its 
counsel, that are binding upon the party making 
them. They may not be controverted at trial or on 
appeal. Indeed, they are mot evidence at ail but 
rather have the effect of withdrawing a fact from 
contention." ' (citations omitted)). 
Further, Ajax quoles from the proposal in 
support of its breach of express warranty and 
breach of contract claims (See Count I ffif 17, 
18; Count III f| 18, 19) and attaches the 
proposal to its complaint. gggFed.R.Civ.P. 
3 0(c) ("A copy of any written instrument 
which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part 
thereof for all puiposes"). Although Ajax 
argues in its memorandum in opposition to 
summary judgment that the proposal 
provisions do not apply, its judicial admissions 
withdraw this fact from contention and 
establish that the terms of the January 27, 
1997, proposal were part of the parties' 
contract and thereby govern this dispute. 
Page 4 of Can-Eng's fourteen-page proposal contained the 
following relevant terms and conditions: 
WARRANTY-CAN-ENG in connection with apparatus 
sold will repair or replace, at the option of CAN-ENG, 
f.o.b. our factory, any defects in workmanship or material 
which may develop undei proper and normal use during a 
period of ninety days from date of shipment oi completion 
of installation if installation is undertaken by CAN-ENG. 
Such repair or replacement shall constitute a fulfillment of 
all CAN-ENG liabilities with respect to such apparatus. 
CAN-ENG shall not be liable for consequential damages. 
This warranty shall not apply if alterations or 
modifications of any nature are made by the Purchaser or 
if erection, installation or stating up is not performed 
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under CAN-ENG supervision or under CAN-ENG 
approved methods. 
CAN-ENG'S liability for the service of any refractories, 
alloy or other component parts manufactured by other than 
CAN-ENG but incorporated in the equipment furnished to 
Purchaser, shall be limited to the guarantee or liability to 
CAN-ENG of the manufacturer or supplier of such 
components. CAN-ENG is not responsible in any manner 
for operation of the equipment in Purchaser's plant. 
CAN-ENG'S warranties or guarantees do not cover the 
process of manufacture oi the quality of the product on 
which this equipment may be used. 
OTHER UNDERSTANDS GS-All previous oral or 
written agreements between the parties hereto which are 
contrary to or inconsistent with this proposal are hereby 
abrogated, it being understood that there are no 
agreements, guaiantees or understandings which are in 
conflict with or inconsistent w ith this proposal. A purchase 
order covering the materials, apparatus or equipment 
specified herein shall be considered by both the Purchaser 
and CAN-ENG to be merely an acceptance of this 
Proposal and the Terms and Conditions set forth herein, 
and any other terms or conditions which may be printed or 
contained on such purchase order which are in conflict 
with or inconsistent with this proposal shall be not 
applicable. This agreement shall be governed by the laws 
of the Province of Ontario, Canada. Any terms and 
conditions herein, which may be in conflict with Ontario 
Law, shall be deleted, however, all other terms and 
conditions shall lemain in force and effect. 
••2 Can-Eng shipped the furnace to Ajax on June 26,1997, 
and it arrived at Ajax's plant on June 27, 1997. Ajax 
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installed and started the furnace itself Over the course of 
the next four years, Ajax experienced problems with the 
furnace, particularly that the furnace would not attain and 
hold the selected temperature, used an excessive amount 
of sand, and did not function properly with compressed ali-
as the atmosphere.—The parties dispute exactly when and 
how often Ajax reported these problems to Can-Eng, bat 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ajax, 
the non-moving party, as this court must, this court finds 
that Ajax lodged a considerable number of complaints 
with Can-Eng. It appears that all of these complaints were 
made more than ninety days after installation. In response 
to many of these complaints, Can-Eng attempted to repair 
or in some way remedy the problem, some, at least, at no 
cost to Ajax. 
FN3. As will be discussed infra, the parties 
dispute the extent of the problems. 
This court now considers Can-Eng's motion for summary 
judgment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under Rule 56(eV summary judgment is proper "if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law."Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). In ruling on a motion 
for summary judgment, the evidence of the nonmovant 
must be believed and all justifiable inferences must be 
drawn in the nonmovant's favor. Anderson v Liberty 
Lobbv. Inc. All U.S. 242, 255 (1996). This court's 
function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the 
truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a 
genuine issue for trial. 
A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular 
issue, however, may not rest on its pleadings, but must 
affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, 
that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires 
trial. CelotexCorp. v Catrett. 411 U.S 317. 324 (1986). 
There is no issue for trial "unless there is sufficient 
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a j ury to return 
a verdict for that Daily." Anderson, 411 U .S. at 249. 
It is not the function of this court to scour the record in 
search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment; the nonmoving party must identify with 
reasonable particularity the evidence upon which that the 
party relies. Bombardv Fort Wtnme Newspapers. Inc., 92 
F.3d 560. 562 (7th Cir. 1996). The evidence relied upon 
must be competent evidence of a type otherwise 
admissible at trial. Id. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Governing L^w 
As a preliminary matter, this court must determine what 
law governs the parties' contract. In order to provide for 
the orderly conduct of international commerce, the United 
States, Canada! and the province of Ontario have adopted 
the United Nations Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods ("CISG" or "Convention")-15 U.S.C.A.App. at 
332; R.S.C.1991, c. 13; R.S.O.1990, CLIO. As Judge 
Lindberg pointed out, "federal caselaw interpreting and 
applying the CISG is scant." Usinor Indusieel v Leeco 
Steel Prods.. It\c. 209 F.Supp.2d 880, 884(N.D.I11.2002). 
The CISG "applies to contracts of sale of goods between 
parties whose places of business are in different States 
when the States are Contracting States."ClSG Art. 1 § 
1 (a). By agreement, pai ties may exclude application of the 
CISG by expressly providing in the contract that the law 
of a non-ClSG jurisdiction applies or that the CISG does 
not control. CISG Art. 6; R.S.O., c.1.10, s. 6. 
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*3 In this case, it is undisputed that Ajax, an Illinois 
corporation, and Can-Eng, an Ontario corporation, are 
parties whose places of business are in different states and 
that these states are contracting states. Thus, unless the 
parties have opted-out, the CISG applies here. The parties' 
contract states that the "agreement shall be governed by 
the laws of the Province of Ontario, Canada."Obviously, 
this clause does not exclude the CISG. Further, although 
the parties have designated Ontario law as controlling, it 
is not the provincial law of Ontario that applies; rather, 
because the CISG is the law of Ontario, the CISG governs 
the parties' agreement. See Asante Techs.. Inc v. 
PMC-Sierra. Inc., 164 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1150 
fN.D.Cal.200O ("Defendant's choice of applicable law 
adopts the law of British Columbia, and it is undisputed 
that the CISG is the law of British Columbia.")-
II. Validity of Warranty 
Although the CISG applies to the parties' contract, 
contrary to Ajax's argument, the lerms and conditions and 
all limitations contained in the contract are not completely 
superceded by the provisions of the CISG. (Ajax's Mem. 
in Opp'n at 4.) The CISG does not preempt a private 
contract between parties; instead, it provides a statutory 
authority from which contract piovisions are interpreted, 
fills gaps in contract language, and governs issues not 
addressed by the contract. In fact, Article 6 states that 
parties may, by contract, "derogate from or vary the effect 
of any of [the CISG's] provisions."CISG Art. 6. 
Accordingly, under the CISG, the terms of the parties' 
agreement control. In this case, the limited warranty, as 
part of the contract executed by the parties, lawfully limits 
Ajax's remedies. As will be discussed below, however, 
there are material facts in dispute as to whether Can-Eng 
has waived this limited warranty. 
Ill Claims Under the CISG 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. 
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In counts 1 and II, Ajax alleges that Can-Eng breached an 
express and implied warranty under the Ontario Sale of 
Goods Act. (Count I % 22; Count II ffl 19, 20.) Can-Eng 
argues that because Ajax cited to the Ontario Sale of Good 
Act, instead of the applicable CISG, summary judgment in 
its favor on these counts is warranted. (Mem. in Support 
at 13-15; Reply at 5.) Under Seventh Circuit precedent, 
however, a plaintiff "cannot plead herself out of court by 
citing to the wrong legal theory or failing to cite any 
theory at all." Ryan v Illinois Dep't of Children & Family 
Serys.. 185 F .3d 751. 764 (7lh Cir. 19991: seealso 
Bartholet v Reishuver A G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073, 
1078 (7th Cir 1992) (explaining that "the complaint need 
not identify a legal theory, and specifying an incorrect 
theory is not fatal"). In the case at hand, "[i]t is of no 
moment therefore that [Ajax's] complaint identified the 
wrong statute as the basis for [its] claim, as long as [its] 
allegations gave notice of a legally sufficient claim and [it] 
brought the legal support for [its] claim to the district 
court's attention in [its] response to [Can-Eng's] summary 
judgment motion." Ryan, 185 F.3d at 764 (citations 
omitted). It is clear that under the CISG actions for breach 
of express and implied warranties are actionable. CISG 
35(1); CISG 35(2). Thus, summary judgment on the basis 
that Ajax brought its claims under the Ontario Sale of the 
Goods Act rather than the CISG is denied. 
IV, Breach of Express Warranty (Count I) and Breach of 
Contract (Count III) 
*4 Page 7 of the January 27, 1997, proposal states that the 
"constant flow of particles assures tremendously uniform 
temperatures of +/-5° with in [sic] the work 
space.'Turther, the document, also on page 7, states that 
"the bed maintains excellent temperature uniformity 
throughout."Finally, page 11 states that one of the 
atmosphere capabilities is "Air." Ajax alleges that 
Can-Eng breached these express warranties and express 
provisions of the contract. 
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Articles 30 and 35 of the C1SG require a seller to "deliver 
goods which are of the quantity, quality and description 
required by the contract....'5 CISG Art. 35; see Art. 30 
("The seller must deliver the goods, hand over any 
documents relating io them and transfer the property in the 
goods, as required by the contract and this Convention."). 
The issue, therefore, is whether the good delivered, i.e., 
the furnace, complied with the express warranties of the 
contract. The parties dispute this point. (See Ajax's Resp. 
to Can-Eng's Specific Allegations of Fact ff 38, 39, 40; 
Can-Eng's Resp. to Aj ax's Stmt, of Additional Facts fl 24, 
31, 32,34, 35,36, 3 7 , 4 0 ^ ) Ajax asserts, interalia, that 
the furnace did not maintain a constant temperature, used 
an excess amount of sand, and, contrary to the express 
warranty, did not function properly with air as the 
atmosphere to fluidize the furnace. Can-Eng disputes these 
allegations and maintains that the furnace worked as 
specified Because there are material facts in dispute as to 
whether the furnace conformed to the express warrant}' 
and specifications in the contract, this court cannot grant 
summary judgment. 
FN4. Can-Eng argues that the statement in 
Michael J. Mai get's affidavit is inconsistent with 
his deposition testimony. The affidavit does not 
state that the furnace "never worked," as 
Can-Eng alleges; rather, it says that the furnace 
"never worked properly for any reasonable 
period..." (Ajax's Stmt, of Additional Facts, Ex. 
15 at f 22 (emphasis added).) This court finds 
that this appears to be an accurate, consistent 
summary of Malget's deposition testimony and is 
therefore admissible. 
Can-Eng argues that although there may be material facts 
in dispute as to the condition of the furnace, the limited 
wairanty precludes Ajax's recovery. Can-Eng asserts that 
its only obligation to Ajax was to repair or replace any 
defects in workmanship or material during a period of 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. 
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ninety days from the date of shipment. Because the alleged 
problems with the furnace occurred after the ninety-day 
warranty period, Can-Eng contends, Ajax is prohibited 
from proceeding on the claims it has asserted against 
Can-Eng. 
Can-Eng advances a strong argument, and Ajax fails to 
address this argument under the CISG in its response. 
Because there ate material facts in dispute as to whether 
Can-Eng has \yaivcd its right to enforce the limited 
warranty, howeyer, this court cannot, as a matter of law, 
enforce the limited warrant}/. A waiver is the 'intentional 
or voluntary relinquishment of a known right, or such 
conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of 
such right..."BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1580 (6th 
ed.1990). As this court has explained above, the CISG is 
the governing liw in this case. However, the parties did 
not present, and this court could not find, any cases under 
the CISG that address the issue of waiver. Article 7 of the 
CISG providesI that in such a case where "[questions 
concerning matters governed by this Convention which are 
not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity 
with the general principles on which it is based or, in the 
absence of such principles, in conformity with the law 
applicable by virtue of the rules of private international 
law."Here, und^r private international law, because of the 
parties1 express choice-of-law provision, Ontario law 
would apply, 
-5 Under Ontario law, a party can waive "by its words and 
conduct" the right to rely on a limited warranty. Genera] 
Refractories Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Veniuredvne Ltd. 
2002 WL 32938 at «fl 157, 2002 Carswell Ont. 36 
(Ont.S.C.J.2002), If Can-Eng gave, after the ninety-day 
period, "repeated assurance that it would support" the 
furnace, a triei of fact could find that it waived its limited 
warrant)'. Id at % 159. Further, Ajax may be able to rely 
on the doctrine of promissory estoppel to preclude 
enforcement of the limited warranty. The General 
Refractories court stated that "[a] promise, whether 
express or inferred from a course of conduct, is intended 
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to be legally binding if it reasonably leads the promisee to 
believe that a legal stipulation, such as strict time of 
performance, will not be insisted upon...."/*:/ at f 158 
(quoting Owen Sound Pub Libraiy v. Mial Devs. Ltd. 
(1979), 102 D.L.R. (3d) 685 (Onl.C.A.), at 691). 
The record shows that there are material facts in dispute as 
to whethei Can-Eng, by providing service and repair, 
some of which at no charge, after the ninety-day limited 
warranty period, waived its limited warranty or whether 
Ajax. can preclude enforcement under the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel. {See Ajax's Resp. to Can-Eng's 
Specific Allegations of Fact ff 38, 39, 40; Can-Eng's 
Resp. to Ajax's Stmt, of Additional Facts 1ffi 21,— 24,26, 
30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41; Can-Eng's 56.1(a) Stmt.^ \% 
35, 36, 37; Can-Eng's Mem. m Support at 9, 12.°^) 
Consequently, summary judgment must be denied as to the 
claims alleged in counts I and 111 of Ajax's complaint. 
FN5. For purposes of summary judgment, this 
court considered only Can-Eng's response, 
wherein it admits that it "provided Ajax with a 
thermocouple, free of charge, and reinstalled the 
original thermocouple."(Can-Eng's Resp. to 
Ajax's Stmt, of Additional Facts \ 21 (emphasis 
added).) 
FN6. Citations to Can-Eng's Local Rule 56.1(a) 
Statement are judicial admissions by Can-Eng 
that it serviced Ajax's furnace more than ninety 
days after shipment of the furnace. 
As stated in this court's January 28, 2003, 
Minute Order, this court has stricken, and thus 
has not consider, the affidavit of James Biody. 
After granting Can-Eng's motion to strike, this 
court received Ajax's response to the motion to 
strike. Because granting the motion to strike 
has no effect on the disposition of this motion 
for summary judgment, the response is moot. 
However, if Can-Eng brings a motion in limine 
to preclude Brody's testimony at trial, Ajax 
may respond to such motion with the facts 
contained in its response to the motion to 
strike. This court will then rule upon such 
motion in limine at the final pre-trial 
conference. 
FN7, Can-Eng admits that it "provided Ajax with 
a cost-free replacement of the furnace's 
thermocouple after the furnace was started-up, 
even though that alleged problem arose shortly 
after ninety clays from shipment.,,"" (Can-Eng's 
Mem. in Support at 12 (emphasis added).) 
V. Breach of Implied Warranty (Count II) and Breach of 
Contract (Count IV) 
Article 30 of the CISG requires the seller to delivei goods 
"as required by ... this Convention.'' CISG Article 35(2) 
states: 
Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods 
do not conform with the contract unless they: 
(a) are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same 
description would ordinarily be used; 
(b) arc fit for any particulai purpose expressly or impliedly 
made known to the seller at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract, except where the circumstances show that the 
buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for him to 
rely, on the seller's skill and judgment.... 
Along with the contract, Ajax alleges that Can-Eng has 
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breached these implied warranties. The same genuine 
questions of material fact as to whether the furnace 
complied with the express warranties apply with equal 
force to the implied warranties. Therefore, this court 
cannot grant summary judgment. 
Can-Eng argues, however, that the limited warranty 
disclaimed any implied warranties. This court disagrees. 
Can-Eng misreads the Cook article cited in its reply 
memorandum. (Reply at 8.) Ms. Cook writes: 
Under CISG, the presumption is that the goods "are fit for 
the purpose for which goods of the same description 
would ordinarily be used" and are "fit for any particular 
purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the seller 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract."However, 
this presumption is subject to an express agreement among 
the parties to the contrary. Under CISG, the only question 
is whether the disclaimer is a part of the agreement 
between the parties, arguably a tougher, yet ultimately 
fairer standard. 
*6 Susanne Cook, CISG: From the Peispeclive of the 
Practitioner 17 J.L £ Com. 343. 347 (1998). 
Contrary to Can-Eng's assertion, the parties' agreement 
does not contain an express disclaimer of any implied 
warranties. The parties have not agreed expressly that the 
furnace did not have to perform in a similar fashion as 
other like furnaces would perform or as Can-Eng 
expressly or impliedly made known that the furnace 
would. The parties' agreement simply limited Ajax's 
remedies. As stated above, this limited warranty provision 
is part of the parties' contract, but a genuine issue of 
material fact exists as to whether Can-Eng has waived, or 
is precluded by the doctrine of promissory estoppel, its 
right to rely on the limited wairanty. Accordingly, 
summary judgment is denied as to the claims alleged in 
counts 11 and IV of Ajax's complaint. 
VI. Ajax's Recovery 
Although issues of material fact preclude summary 
judgment as to liability, because there are no genuine 
issues of material fact as to some of Ajax's alleged 
damages and Can-Eng is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law, summary judgment is appropriate in part. 
A. Consequential Damages 
It is undisputed that the parties' agreement states that 
"CAN-ENG shall not be liable for consequential 
damages."As discussed above, such limited liability 
provision is enforceable under the CISG. Further, although 
Article 74 of tjhe CISG provides for consequential 
damages, "[sjuclj damages may not exceed the loss which 
the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the light of 
the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to 
have known, as a possible consequence of the breach of 
contract,"OSG Art. 74. Because Ajax did not address this 
point in its response memorandum, as best this court can 
tell, Ajax has not introduced any evidence that the 
consequential damages sought were foreseeable to 
Can-Eng. For thjsse reasons and because there are no facts 
disputed, summary judgment is granted as to 
consequential damages. 
B, Lost Productivity Damages 
As discussed above, a judicial admission by a party takes 
an issue out of contention. At a January 15,2003, healing 
before Magistrate Judge Keys, the court stated on the 
record that Ajax's counsel had taken "lost productivity," 
"lost profits," and "lost customers" "off the table," 
(Can-Eng's Resp. to Ajax's Stmt, of Additional Facts, Ex. 
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F at 10.) In addition, the court's minute ordei ofthat date END OF DOCUMENT 
made it clear that "[djuring oral argument plaintiffs 
counsel assured the defendant that it is not seeking 
damages for loss of business and profits. '(Can-Eng's 
Resp to Ajax's Stmt, of Additional Facts, Ex. F.) Based 
on Ajax's judicial admissions, there are no facts in dispute 
as to this issue; consequently, Can-Eng is entitled to 
summary judgment as to damages for loss of business and 
profits. See Soo Line R. Co , 125 F .3d at 483; Keller, 58 
F.3dat 1198 n. 8. 
C, Attorneys' Fees 
*7 Ajax's complaint seeks attorneys' fees "pursuant to the 
law of Ontario, Canada...." (Prayers for Relief) The 
parties now agree, however, that attorneys' fees are a 
procedural matter governed by the law of the forum As 
the Seventh Circuit recently held, *c Moss' in Article 74 
does not include attorneys' fees...." Zapata Hcrmanos 
Sucesores, S.A. v. Hcarlhside Bak'mz Co , Inc ,313 F.3cl 
385,389 (7th Cir.2002). Accordingly, because there is no 
genuine issue of fact for trial, summary judgment on this 
issue is granted. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, defendant's motion for 
summary judgment is denied as to counts I, II, III, and IV 
of plaintiff Ajax's complaint and granted as to Ajax's 
demand of consequential damages, lost productivity 
damages, and attorneys' fees. 
N.D.IH.,2003. 
Ajax Tool Works, Inc. v. Can-Eng Mfg. Ltd. 
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v. 
UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE 
ASSOCIATION, and William Kohlbecker, individually, 
and as District Manager for United Services Automobile 
Association, Defendants. 
No.99-1046-CIV-T-17F. 
Oct. 4, 1999. 
Scott Charlton, Clark, Charlton, Martino & Borders, P.A., 
Tampa, FL, for Veronica Blakely, individually and as a 
potential class member, plaintiff 
Scott Charlton, (See above), for Brenda R. Schmelzle, 
individually and as a potential class member, plaintiff. 
John W. Campbell, Michael Dennis Malfitano, Angeiique 
Groza Lvons, Vincent R. Spano, Malfitano Campbell & 
Dickinson, Tampa, FL, for United Services Automobile 
Association, defendant. 
John W. Campbell, Michael Dennis Malfitano, Angelique 
Groza Lyons, Vincent R. Spano, (See above), for William 
Kohlbecker, individually and as District Manager for 
United Services Automobile Association, defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND REQUEST 
FOR SANCTIONS 
KOVACHEVICRJ. 
-I This cause is before the Court on Defendants, United 
Services Automobile Association's and William 
Kohlbecker's, individual Amended Motions to Dismiss 
(Diets.7-10) which seek to dismiss multiple claims against 
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both Defendants. In addition, Defendant Kohlbecker 
requests sanctions against Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' counsel 
(Diets.7-8). Plaintiffs have filed Responses to Defendants' 
Motions (Diets. 11 > 16). Plaintiffs previously filed a Motion 
for Consolidation (Diet. 12) that was denied by this Court. 
As a procedural matter, Defendants' previously filed joint 
Motion to Dismiss (Diet.4) is dismissed as moot in light of 
the subsequent Aniended Motions. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the 
sufficiency of trie Plaintiffs Complaint to determine 
whether it sets forth sufficient allegations to establish a 
claim for relief. Under Conicv v. Gibson 355 U.S 4L 45 
(1957), a district Court should not dismiss a complaint for 
failure to state a claim solely on the pleadings "unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support bf his claim which could entitle him to 
relief."Additionally, when deciding a motion to dismiss, a 
court must accept the truthfulness of well-pleaded facts 
and resolve theni in the light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff. See Scl\euer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974V. 
seealso Beck v. Dehiffe. 144 F.3d 732. 735-36 (11th 
Cir. 1998) (quoting St Joseph's Hasp.. Inc. v Hospital 
Cow, of Am.. 795 F.2d 948 (1 1th CirJ986T). 
To dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, the 
Plaintiffs Complaint must only meet an exceedingly low 
standard of sufficiency. SeeAncatav. Prison Health Sew, 
Inc., 769 F.2d 700. 703 (11th Cir.1985). However, when 
no construction of the facts can produce a cause of action 
as to a dispositive issue of law, dismissal is appiopriate. 
See Executive /Qfi Inc v. Martin County. 922 F.2d 1536 
(11th Cir. 1991); seealso Powell v. United States, 945F.2d 
374 (11th Cir. 19^1). Using this standard, the Court turns 
to the consideration of the claims asserted. 
Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d 
"Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 1999 WL 1053122 (M.D.Fla. 
(Cite as: 1999 WL 1053122 (M.D.Fla.)) 
BACKGROUND 
The following allegations, taken from the Complaint and 
its attached exhibits, are considered true for the present 
purpose of deciding whether to dismiss Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. See Beck 144 F.3d at 735. 
Defendant United Services Automobile Association 
(QSAA) employed Plaintiff Veronica Blakely from 
February 1986 to January 8, 1999. During her 
employment with USAA, Blakely "was an industrious 
employee, received and followed directions and orders 
from superiors, was charged with and diligently supervised 
the persons under Plaintiff, received regulai promotions 
both as to job duties and responsibilities and salary, [and] 
received satisfactory or better job evaluations.'"(Comply 
4.) After working as Claims Manager for eleven and 
one-half years, Blakely was informed by Defendant 
William Kohlbecker, an agent of USAA, that she was 
bemg demoted to the position of Customer Insurance 
Team Consultant Blakely reapplied for her management 
position and was turned down on August 24, 1998, when 
Kohlbecker explained that USAA "decided to 'go with a 
different management team.'5 ' (Comply 54.) At various 
times throughout her employment with USAA, Blakely 
received negative evaluations with derogatory remarks 
including, but not limited to, "not being a team player." 
(Compl.ffl 75-76.) On January 8, 1999, Blakely 
terminated her employment with USAA. 
*2 Plaintiff Brenda R. Schmelzle asserts similar claims 
against USAA. Schmelzle was employed by USAA from 
January 1988 to August 28, 1998. Schmelzle also asserts, 
in sum, that she acted diligently in her duties with USAA. 
In mid-August, 1998, Schmelzle was informed that she 
was being demoted to the position of Customer Insurance 
Team Consultant. Additionally, she was told that she 
would be terminated at the end of two years if she did not 
find employment elsewhere. Schmelzle terminated her 
employment with Defendant on August 28, 1998. 
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Both Blakely and Schmelzle assert that all managers 
whom USAA demoted were over the age of forty. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that were replaced by 
workers under the age of forty, as were the other 
employees that USAA replaced. Further, both contend that 
USAA was not undergoing a "reorganization" or a 
"reduction in force," but rather "was engaged in a 
systematic plan to eliminate older workers."(Compl ? P 6 , 
40.) On January 6, 1999 and February 9, 1999, Blakely 
and Schmelzle respectively were mailed Dismissal and 
Notice of Rights letters (EEOC Form 161 (10/96)) from 
the Equal Employment Opporl unity Commission. (Compl. 
at Ex. A, B.) 
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs assert claims against two 
Defendants, USAA and William Kohlbecker. Both 
Defendants have filed Amended Motions calling for the 
dismissal of multiple claims against them. For ease and 
clarity, the Court will address the Motions of each 
Defendant individually. 
L Defendant USAA's Amended Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs' assert the following allegations against USAA 
in their Complaint: 
1) Counts 1 & II: Title VII age discrimination (Blakely & 
Schmelzle); 
2) Counts III & IV: Florida Human Rights Act violation 
(Blakely & Schmelzle); 
3) Count V. Retaliation in violation of Title VII (Blakely); 
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4) Count VI: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
(Blakely & Schmelzle); 
5) Count VLI: Constructive discharge (Blakely & 
Schmelzle); 
6) Counts VIII & IX: ADEA and OWBPA age 
discrimination (Blakely & Schmelzle). 
A. Counts I, II, VII (Title VII) 
USAA argues that Counts I, II, and VII of Plaintiffs* 
Complaint should be dismissed because age is not a 
protected class under Title VII. In response, Plaintiffs 
state that "Title VII may and certainly should be broadly 
construed to carry out the legislative intent of preventing 
all discrimination by enforcement of Title VIL"(Pls.' 
Resp. to USAA's Am. Mot, to Dismiss at 4.) In addition, 
Plaintiffs cite Parr v. Woodmen, 791 P.2d 888, 892 (1 lth 
Or. 1986), as concluding that "Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act provides us with a clear mandate from Congress that 
no longer will the United States tolerate this form of 
discrimination.'XPls.' Resp. to USAA's Am. Mot. to 
Dismiss at 4.) However, this is a misinterpretation of the 
law. When the Woodmen court quoted Culpepper v. 
Reynolds Metal Co , 421 F 2d 888. 891 (5th Cir. 1970V it 
was clearly referring to "this form of discrimination" as 
racial discrimination, not age discrimination. 
*3 In light of the available remedies for age discrimination 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), 29 U.SC. §5 621-634(19991 the Court is not 
persuaded by Plaintiffs' policy arguments for the 
expansion of Title VII to include age discrimination. 
Further, available case law illustrates the wording of the 
statute which prohibits discrimination in the employment 
setting on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.See42 U.S.C. S 2000e-3(a) (1999). As 
such, age is not a protected class under Title VII. See 
Rogers \> American Airlines. Inc., 527 F.Supp. 229, 232 
(SD.N.Y.1981) (interpreting Title VII as directed at only 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); Garcia v. 
Gloor, 618 F.2d 264,269 (5th Cir. 1980V, Farawellv. City 
of Jersey City, No. CIV.A. 86-290, 1986 WL 5916, at *4 
(D.N.J. May 20,1986) (stating Title VII "does not accord 
a cause of action for the redress of age discrimination"). 
Counts I, II & VII are therefore dismissed with prejudice. 
B. Counts III & IV (FHRA) 
Defendants argue that Counts III and IV should be 
dismissed because they are brought under a nonexistent 
statute. That is, the headings to Counts III and IV assert a 
claim under the Florida Human Rights Act of 1997 and the 
text of the Complaint charges that the "Defendants' actions 
were willful and in direct contravention of the provisions 
of Title VII: Florida Human Rights Act of 1977, as 
amended/>(Compl.<flf 55, 68.) Plaintiffs assert that is was 
their good faith jbelief at the time of the accrual of the 
present action that the Florida Human Rights Act, as 
named in the Complaint, was in full effect. Further, 
Plaintiffs ask that the Court take notice of the corrected 
title of the statute as the difference is only in name. 
The Florida Human Rights Act of 1977 (Fla.Stat.AniL g 
760.01-760.10) was renamed in 1992 as the Florida Civil 
Rights Act of 11992 (Fla.Stat.Ann. S 760.01-760.11, 
509.092VtReference to the wrong statute or an erroneous 
basis of jurisdiction will be corrected by the court if it can 
determine the appropriate statute or jurisdictional source 
from the complaint." Hitss v Green Spring Health Serv., 
Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 400, 402 (D.Dcl 1998) (quoting in 
parenthetical 5. Charles A Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1210, at 121); seealso 
Ghsson y LIS Forest Serv., 55 F.3d 1325, 1328 (7th 
Cn.1995) (stating that "if a court has jurisdiction it must 
retain a case even if the parties have failed to identify the 
correct basis of the court's jurisdiction"). In the present 
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case, it is apparent that Plaintiffs intended a cause of 
action under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. As 
such, Defendants are not entitled to the dismissal of 
Counts III and VI based upon this argument. 
As an additional argument, Defendants contend that 
Blakely's claim under the FCRA (Count 111) should be 
dismissed because she forfeited her right to bring suit 
under this statute by filing a civil lawsuit during the 
FCRA's investigation period. Blakely asserts that her 
receipt of a Right to Sue Letter from the EEOC entitled 
her to bring a claim under the FCRA because of the 
"work-sharing agreement" between the EEOC and the 
FCHR. See Mason v Kmart Corp., 1 F.Supp.2d 1333, 
1336 (M.D.Fla 1998). Under this agreement, the EEOC 
and the FCHR act as symbiotic agencies. Therefore, it is 
not necessary for each agency to undertake its own 
independent investigation before Plaintiff can proceed 
with a claim. 
*4 The FCRA provides that the Florida Commission on 
Human Relations (FCHR) shall investigate the allegations 
in a FCRA claim within 180 days to determine whether 
reasonable cause exists. SeeFla Stat. Ann. § 760.11(3) 
(1997). If the Commission determines that there is 
reasonable cause, the complaining party has two options: 
1) bring a civil action; or 2) request an administrative 
hearing. Seeid at § 760.11(4). In the event the 
Commission find that reasonable cause does not exist, the 
claim will be dismissed. Seeid § 760.1 1(7). At this 
juncture, the complainant's only recourse is to request an 
administrative hearing within 35 days, otherwise the claim 
under the FCRA will be barred. Seeid.Only if this 
administrative hearing determines that a violation of the 
FCRA has occurred may the complainant bring a civil 
action. Seeid. 
The piesent situation can be viewed two ways* 1) the 
letteis issued to Plaintiffs by the EEOC constituted a 
decision by both the EEOC and the FCHR; or 2) the 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. 
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letters issued by the EEOC did not constitute a 
determination of reasonable cause by the FCHR. 
However, Blakely's cause of action is defeated at either 
turn. 
Blakely asserts that because she dual-filed her claim with 
the EEOC and the FCHR on November 10,1998, the 180 
day investigation period ceased and a cause of action 
accrued at the time the EEOC issued Blakely a Right to 
Sue letter. However, if the letter issued by the EEOC 
constituted the final judgment by both the EEOC and the 
FCHR, then Blakely was required to request an 
administrative hearing within 35 days after the receipt of 
the letter. This is so because the letter received by Blakely 
on January 6, 1999 was a "Dismissal and Notice of 
Rights" issued by the EEOC (Form 161 (10/96)). In the 
correspondence, the EEOC detennined that it was "unable 
to conclude that the information obtained established][a] 
violation of the statutes."(Compl. at Ex. B.) This letter 
issued by the EEOC to Blakely differs from EEOC Form 
161-A (10/96) which states: "The EEOC found reasonable 
cause to believe that violations of the statute(s) occurred 
with respect to some or all of the matters alleged in the 
charge but could not obtain a settlement with the 
Respondent that would provide relief for you." 
Upon receipt of a "Form 161 (10/96)" letter, the EEOC 
guidelines allow the complainant to bring suit in a court of 
law within 90 days for claims under Title VII, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, and/or the ADEA, Secl2 
C.F.R. §268 505(c) (1999). However, the dismissal of a 
claim has a different effect under the FCRA. If the EEOC's 
determination is taken as the FCHR's decision under the 
"work-sharing" policy between the FCHR and the EEOC, 
Blakely would not be permitted to bring suit, but rather 
would have to request an administrative hearing within 35 
days because reasonable ceiuse was not found. SeeFh. 
Stat. Ann. § 760 11(7) (1999). 
This Couit dealt with an identical claim in Dawkins v. 
o Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works, 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 1999 WL 1053122 (M.D.Fla. 
(Cite as: 1999 WL 1053122 (M.D.Fla.)) 
Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., No. 
QQ-9QVCiv-T-17C. 1999 WL434656"S (M.D. Fla. June 
8, 1999). In Dawkins, an employee brought a claim under 
the ADA as well as the FCRA. Seeicl. Under the 
worksharing agreement between the EEOC and the FCHR, 
filing with one agency constituted filing with the other. 
Seeid As such, when the EEOC handed down a no-cause 
finding, the need to file for an administrative hearing 
within 35 days under the FCRA was triggered. SeeidThat 
is, the EEOC's finding took the place of the FCHR's 
potential finding. The same set of facts present themselves 
in this case. Plaintiffs leceived a "Dismissal and Notice of 
Rights" lettei from the EEOC. This decision by the EEOC 
replaced the decision by the FCHR and therefore failed to 
find the reasonable cause necessary to make the cause 
actionable under the FCRA. As such, the Court finds that 
Blakely did not request an administrative hearing within 
the permitted time period and thus is barred from pursuing 
a claim under this statute. 
*5 Even if the Court was to determine that the EEOC's 
decision was not one and the same with the FCHR's 
decision under the "work-sharing" agreement, Blakely's 
claim would still fail. Fla Stat Ann §760.11 (1999) has 
been-interpreted to require a complainant to postpone 
filing a civil suit until the 180 day investigation period of 
the FCHR has expired or a determination as to reasonable 
cause has been made. Absent the EEOC decision, no 
determination was made as to the validity of the FCRA 
claim. As such, Blakely was required to wait the full 180 
days. Instead, she filed her Complaint on April 1, 1999, 
only 142 days after dually filing with the EEOC and the 
FCHR. Due to this premature filing, Blakely's claim under 
the FCRA would still be barred. Therefore, Counts III and 
IV are dismissed with prejudice. 
C. Count V (Retaliation) 
As this claim is alieady before the Court in a separate 
action, both Defendants and Plaintiff agree that Count V 
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alleging retaliation is redundant. Plaintiff filed a Motion to 
Consolidate the claims pursuant to Local Rule 1.04(b) 
(Diet. 12). This Motion was denied by this Court on June 
17,1999. Count V is therefore redundant in this action and 
is dismissed with prejudice. 
D. Count VI (Intehtional Infliction of Emotional Distress) 
Defendants move to dismiss Count VI of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint on the grounds that the conduct alleged is not 
"outrageous" enough to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. Plaintiffs argue that the question of 
outrageousness is properly one for the jury to decide. 
Under applicable Florida law, in order to state a cause of 
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress the 
Plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) deliberate or reckless 
infliction of mental suffering by defendant; 2) by 
outrageous conduct; 3) which conduct of the defendant 
must have caused the suffering; and 4) the suffering must 
have been severe. See Metropolitan Life Ins Co v 
McCarson 467 So.2d 277 (Fla 1985). In addition, the 
court in Metropolitan Life adopted the Restatements 
definition of this, tort. See/6? This standard provides for 
liability when "tijie conduct has been so outrageous in 
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all 
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as 
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community.'Yflf. at 278 (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §46(1965V). 
What is "outrageous" is a question of law for this Court to 
determine. See Baker v. Florida Nat'1 Bank 559 So.2d 
284.287 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990)\ Ponton v Scarfone, 468 
So 2d 1009. 1010 fFla.DistCt.App 1985) (citing 
Metropolitan Life, 461 So.2d 277 (Fla 1985)). The actions 
of Defendants as Set forth in the pleadings do not l each the 
level of relentless physical and verbal harassment 
necessary to survive a motion to dismiss. See Lawhom v. 
No Claim to Oiig. US Gov. Works. 
Not Reported m F Supp 2d 
Not Reported m F Supp 2d, 1999 WL 1053122 (M D Fla 
(Cite as 1999 WL 1053122 (MD Fla)) 
kmncvlkoe Corp , No 97-1463-C1V-T-17E . 1998 WL 
182421 atT4 (M D Fla 1998), seeaLso Ponton, 468 So 2d 
at 1010 (stating that employei vei bally attempting to 
induce employee to have sex was not outi ageous) In iact, 
both Floi ida and fedei al com ts have been vei y i esistant to 
find a cause of action foi this tort m the employment 
setting See Mai tin v Baei, 928 F 2d 1067, 1074 n 15 
(11th Cn 1991) Plaintiffs assert only that they suffeied 
emotional distiess as a lesult of then demotion and 
Defendant's discummatoiy actions (Comply 89, 90) 
Fi om this, Plaintiffs allege that "Defendants' actions wei e 
in delibei ate disi egai d of a high pi obability that emotional 
distiess would follow' and Defendants' actions weie 
delibeiate, intentional, and malicious, oi m the alternative 
weie undertaken with l eckless disi egai d foi tl ie civil l ights 
of the Plaintiff "(Comply 84) These allegations, even 
when viewed m the light most favoiable to the Plaintiffs, 
do not meet the thieshold necessaiy to sui vive Defendants' 
Motions Accoidmgly, Count VI of Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
as it pertains to USAA, is dismissed with piejudice 
E Counts VIII & IX (ADEA and OWBPA) 
"6 USAA moves to dismiss Counts VIII and IX of 
Plaintiffs' Complaint msofai as it involves claims undei 
the Oldei Woikeis Benefit Pi otection Act (OWBPA) 
USAA asserts that Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts that 
would enable lecovery undei the OWBPA as it amended 
the ADEA m 1990 
Plaintiffs agiee that they did not sign a waivei agieement 
with Defendant, but aigue that waivei is not the issue on 
which they base then OWBPA claim Furthei, Plaintiffs 
assert that the basis of then claim is the denial of "benefits 
which entitled them, as piotected employees, to state a 
claim undei OWBPA "(Pis * Resp to USAA's Am Mot 
to Dismiss at 7 ) Finally, "it should be undisputed that 
salary, msuiance and letnement benefits aie benefits of 
employment "Id 
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The OWBPA amended the ADEA m 1990 in lesponse to 
the United States Supieme Court's holding in Public 
Employees Retirement Sys ofOhio v Beits 492 U S 158 
(1989) See Oldei Woikeis Benefit Pi otection Act of 1990, 
Pub L No 101-433 104 Stal 978(1990) In Belts, the 
benefits exception pi ovision of the ADEA was mtei pi eted 
by the Supieme Court m a way that did not piotect aging 
woikers fiom age disci miination with legaid to benefits 
See45A Am Jui 2d Older Woikeis Benefit Pi otection Act, 
Generally § 814(1999) Moie specifically, the Court held 
that Section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA did not piotect 
age-based distinctions in benefit plans only when these 
plans weie wan anted by the mci eased cost m pioviding 
benefits foi oldei woikeis See Belts 492 US at 175 As 
a lesult, Congiess was compelled to undertake legislative 
action in oi dei to I estoi e its oi igmal intent, "which was to 
piohibit disciimmation against oldei woikeis m all 
employee benefits except when age-based l eductions m 
employee benefit plans aie justified by significant cost 
consideiation "OWBPA, Pub L No 101-433. 104 Stat 
978(1990) 
The OWBPA amended the ADEA m two key ways Fust, 
Congiess spelled out its intent to implement an "equal 
benefit oi equal cost" pnnciple in Title 1 of the OWBPA 
45A Am Tui 2d Oldei Workers Benefit Pi otection Act, 
Geneially §814(1999) This stand aid allows employei s 
to piovide less benefits to oldei woikeis so long as the 
employei spends at least the same amount of money on 
oldei woikeis as she does on youngei woikeis m 
pioviding the benefits Seeid,seealso OWBPA, Pub L 
No 101-433, 104 Stat 978(1990) (coding as amended m 
29 U S C H 621, 623) Second, Title II clanfies 
ciicumstances m which waivei s of rights piovided undei 
the ADEA aie piopei Seeid,seeaho Joseph M 
Pelhcciotti, Oldei Woikeis Benefit Pi otection Act of 
1990 Congiess Responds to Beits Decision, 35 Res 
Gestae MA, 116(1991) 
Plaintiffs allege m then Complaint that it was "by leason 
of Defendant, USAA's actions that Plaintiffs have 
io Claim to Ong US Gov Woiks 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 1999 WL 1053122 (M.D.Fla 
(Cite as: 1999 WL 1053122 (M.D.Fla.)) 
sustained a loss of past and future earnings, a loss of or 
reduction in benefits, a loss of or reduction of retirement 
benefits."(Complfl 108,120). This statement is Plaintiffs' 
only reference to either Blakely's or Schmelzle's employee 
benefits in the entire document Further, no allegations 
have been made as to any violation of the OWBPA by 
means of disparate benefit allocation or waiver of rights. 
Plaintiffs naked claim as to a loss or reduction in benefits 
is simply not enough to sustain a cause of action under this 
Act. As such, Counts XIII and XI are dismissed without 
prejudice as they allege a cause of action under the 
OWBPA. 
II. Defendant William Kohlbecker's Amended Motion to 
Dismiss and Request for Sanctions 
*7 As not all counts in the Complaint assert causes of 
action against Defendant Kohlbecker, it is necessary to 
delineate those counts that do. Kohlbecker is included as 
a Daily Defendant in the following allegations: 
1) Count I: Violation of Title VII; 
2) Count III: Actions in direct contravention of the Florida 
Human Rights Act of 1977; 
3) Count V: Retaliation in violation of Title VII; 
4) Count VI: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; 
and 
5) Count VII: Constructive Discharge. 
A. Counts I, III, V, and VII (Title VII and FCRA) 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. 
Page 7 
Fla I Weekly Fed. D 79 
Kohlbecker moves to dismiss Counts I, V, and VII by 
arguing that individual liability does not exist under either 
Title VII or the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA). As such, 
Kohlbecker cannot be held individually liable under either 
of these statutes. In Plaintiffs' response to Defendant's 
motion, Plaintiffs state that they "would agree through 
stipulation to dismiss claims brought under Title VII 
aga ins t Defendant , William Kohlbecker, 
individually."(Pl.ls Resp. to Kohlbecker's Mot. to Dismiss 
at 1.) Similarly, Plaintiffs agree to dismiss the individual 
claim against Kohlbecker under the FCRA by mutual 
stipulation. 
The Eleventh Circuit clearly holds that individual liability 
does not exist under Title VII. See Mason v. Stallings, 
C.L. 82 F.3d 1007.1008 (11 th Cir.1991) (citing Smith v. 
Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403 n. 4 (11th Cir.1995), Busby v. 
Cit\> of Orlando. 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir.1991)); 
Weldv. Southeastern Cos., Inc.. 10F. Supp2d 1318.1321 
(M.D.Fla.1998) (dismissing Title VII claim against 
individual). Further, case law directly states that the.FCRA 
does not allow claims against individual defendants in 
their individual capacity. See Burger v: City of Dayton a 
Beach. No. 94-1245-C1V-ORL-22. 1996 WL 673144/ 6 
fM,PyFlayl996VGott^ 
95-1250-CIV-ORL-22, 1996 WL 438783/ 1 
(M.D.Fla. 1996); Paris v. City of Coral Gables. 951 
F.Supp. 1584, 1585 (S.D.Fla.1995). Moreover, as stated 
above, age discrimination is not a cause of action under 
Title VII. Finally, Plaintiffs did not meet their 
administrative requirements as was necessary before filing 
a FCRA claim. In light of Plaintiffs' stipulations and the 
above authority, Counts I, III, V, and VII are dismissed 
with prejudice a^  they pertain to Defendant Kohlbecker in 
his individual capacity. 
B. Count VI (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) 
Both Plaintiffs and Defendants recite identical arguments 
in regard to Kohlbecker's Motion to Dismiss as in USAA's 
:o Claim to Orig. tfS Gov. Works. 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 1999 WL 1053122 (M.D.FIa. 
(Cite as: 1999 WL 1053122 (M.D.FIa.)) 
Motion to Dismiss Count VI. As such, the above 
discussion of Florida law on Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress in section 1(D) of this Order applies 
here. The only additional information is Plaintiffs' 
contention that Kohlbecker was the individual who 
informed Blakely that she was being demoted. These facts 
clearly do not reach the level of outrageousness required 
to survive Kohlbecker's Motion. See Lawhorn, 1998 WL 
182421 at *1; seed so Ponton, 468 So 2d at 1010. 
Accordingly, Count VI of Plaintiffs' Complaint is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
C. Sanctions 
*8 In his Amended Motion to Dismiss, Kohlbecker 
"respectfully requests the Court to consider sanctions 
against Plaintiffs and/or their counsel due to the frivolous 
nature of the claims asserted against him."(Kohlbecker's 
Am. Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) No further support or 
clarification of this charge is proffered in the Motion. 
Apparently, Kohlbecker is attempting to institute Rule 11 
sanctions against Plaintiffs. However, such bare-bones 
allegations of misconduct cannot be considered by the 
Court. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set forth the proper 
procedure to be followed when attempting to initiate Rule 
11 sanctions by motion. SeeFe&R.Civ.P. IKDfA). First, 
a motion for Rule 11 sanctions must be filed separately 
from other motions or requests. Seeid. Second, the motion 
must "describe the specific conduct alleged to violate 
[Rule WV'Id .Further, this motion must be served in 
accordance with Rule 5, but should not be presented to the 
court until after opposing counsel has been given a 21 day 
"safe harbor" period in which to correct oi withdraw the 
offending document. Seeid,seealso DeShiro v Branchy 
183 FR.D. 281 (M D.Fla.1998) (explaining in detail the 
"safe harbor" peiiod). In short, Kohlbeckei's simple 
request for sanctions at the conclusion of his Motion to 
Dismiss falls far short of completing the necessary steps 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. 
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required for such a motion. Moreover, the Court cannot 
hypothesize on whether Kohlbecker intended to bring his 
request for sanctions under an alternative rule. As such, 
Defendant's Motion for Sanctions is denied. Accordingly, 
it is 
ORDERED that Counts 1-VII of Plaintiffs Complaint be 
DISMISSED with piejudice as against Defendants USAA 
and William Kohlbecker. USAA did not move to dismiss 
the claims alleged by Plaintiffs under the ADEA in Counts 
VIII and IX. As such, these claims are still pending with 
this Court. However, Counts VIII and IX as they pertain 
to the OWBPA are DISMISSED without prejudice and 
Plaintiff shall have ton (10) days from the date of this 
Order to amend the Complaint. Finally, Defendant 
Kohlbecker's Motion for Sanctions (Dkt.7) is DENIED. 
M.D.FIa, 1999. 
Blakely v. United Sendees Auto. Ass'n 
Not Reported in F.Supp.'Zd, 1999 WL 3 053122 
(M.D.FIa.), 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 79 
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Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of 
Middlesex. 
Dawn ROMAN 
v. 
CITY OF Mil)I)LETOWN BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
No. CV065000318S. 
March 7, 2007. 
Weigand Mahon & Adelman PC, Meriden, for Dawn 
Roman. 
Middletown City Attorney, Middletown, for City of 
Middletown Board of Education. 
AURIGEMMA, J 
*1 The defendant, the City of Middletown Board of 
Education, has moved for summary judgment on the 
grounds that the Complaint fails to allege a cause of action 
that serves to abrogate the doctrine of governmental 
immunity, and the Complaint fails to plead a cognizable 
claim under Connecticut General Statutes § 7-465 or £ 
10-235. 
Facts 
Neither party has submitted any affidavit or othci evidence 
in connection with the Motion for Summary Judgment. It 
appears that, at least for the purposes of that motion, the 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West 
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defendant is accepting the factual allegations of the 
Complaint as being true. 
The Complaint alleges that on February 4, 2006, the 
plaintiff, Dawn Roman, was a parent of students attending 
a childcare program at the Snow School in Middletown. 
At 7:30 a.m. the plaintiff airived at Snow School to drop 
her two children| off for the childcare program. The 
plaintiff alleges that she parked her vehicle in front of the 
school and started walking on the walkway towards the 
entrance, when she was caused to slip and fall on ice and 
snow on the walkway. 
The plaintiff alleges that the City of Middletown Board of 
Education, its servants, agents or employees, were 
negligent in a number of ways, including the failure to 
supervise custodians to keep the walkway safe, allowing 
the walkway to be icy and unsafe, failing to warn the 
plaintiff about the conditions and failing to inspect and 
remedy the conditions. 
Discussion of the Law and Ruling 
Practice Book § J7-49 provides that summary judgment 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and 
any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Foifik v. Hunter, 
265 Conn. 385. 38Q. 828 A.2d 596 (2003); Myivcfiv May 
Dept Stores Co . 260 Conn. I 52. 158-59, 793 A.2d 1068 
(2002); Howe Ins Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co . 235 
Conn. 185. 202 663 A.2d 1001 (1995). Although the 
party seeking summary judgment has the burden of 
showing the coexistence of any material fact; D H.R. 
Construction Co. v. Donnelly, 180 Conn. 430. 434. 429 
A.2d 908 (1980); a party opposing summary judgment 
must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there 
o Claim to 0\ ig. US Gov, Works. 
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is a genuine issue of matenal fact, togethci with the 
evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue 
Piacticc Book (?§ 17-45, 17 46, Bums v Haitfoid 
Hospital 102 Conn 4^K4^S 472 A 2d 1257(1984) In 
deciding a motion foi summaiy judgment, the tual couit 
must view the evidence in the light most favoiable to the 
nonmovmgpai ty fawn Bank £ Tmst Co v Benson, 176 
Conn 304 309 407 A 2d 9 71 (1978), Slut da \> 
Connecticut Ncwspapeis Inc 193 Conn 313 317 477 
A 2d 1005 (1984) The test is whethei a paity would be 
entitled to a dnected veidict on the same facts Bafickv 
Sevmow 186 Conn 632 647 443 A 2d 471 (]9W)<New 
Mil foul Savings Bank v Ro ma 38 Conn App 240 
243-44. 659 A 2d 1226(1995) 
"2 Summaiy judgment should only be gi anted if the 
pleadings, affidavits and othei pi oof submitted 
demonstiate that theie is no genuine issue as to any 
matenal fact Santo v Slam, 224 Conn 524, 330 620 
A2d_99_ceit denied, MO US 861 114 S Ct 176 126 
LEd2d 136(1993), Connelly Cohvell 214 Conn 242 
246 V7I A 2d 116 (1991) Summaiy judgment is 
"designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating 
an issue wheie theie is no leal issue to be tued " )) ilson 
l City of New Haven 213 Conn 277 779, D67 A 2d 829 
(1989) 
The defendant laises both piocedmal and substantive 
giounds foi the entry of summaiy judgment The plaintiff 
has cieated a pioceduial jioblem by amending the 
Complaint m I esponse to the defendant's i equest to l evise 
to allege that she lehes on Connecticut Geneial Statutes fr 
7465 and? 10-235 
Connecticut Gencial Statutes fr 7 ^6^>(a) piovides m 
l elevant pail 
Any to\Mi> city oi boiough, notwithstanding any 
inconsistent piovision of lew, geneial, special oi local, 
Page 2 
shall pay on behalf of any employee of such 
municipality all sums whi zh such employee becomes 
obligated to pay by leason of the liability imposed upon 
such employee by law foi damages awaided foi 
physical damages to peison oi piopeity, except as set 
foith in this section, if the employee, at the time of the 
occunence, accident, physical lnjuiy oi damages 
complained of, was acting m the peifoimance of his 
duties and within the scope of his employment, and if 
such occunence, accident, physical injury oi damage 
was not the lesult of any wilful oi wanton act of such 
employee in the dischaige of such duty Govei nmental 
immunity shall not be a defense m any action biought 
undei this section 
Connecticut Geneial Statutes fr 10 235 piovides m 
lelevantpait 
(a) Each boaid of education shall piotect and save 
haimless any membei of such boaid oi any teachei oi 
othei employee theieof oi any membei of its 
supei visoiy oi admmistiative staff, shall piotect and 
save haimless any membei of such boaids, oi any 
teachei oi othei employee theieof oi any membei of its 
supei visoiy oi admmistiative staff employed by it, fiom 
financial loss and expense, including legal fees and 
costs, if any, ai ising out of any claim, demand, suit oi 
judgment by leason of alleged negligence oi othei act 
lesultmg m accidental bodily injury to oi death of any 
peison, oi m accidental damage to oi destiuction of 
pioperty,withmoi without the school buildmgpiovided 
such teachei, membei oi employee, at the time of the 
acts I esulting in such mjui y, damage oi desti uction, was 
acting m the dischaige of Ins oi hei duties oi within the 
scope of employment oi undei the dnection of such 
boaid of education, piovided that thepiovisions of this 
section shall not limit oi othei wise affect application of 
section 4 165 concerning immunity fiom peisonal 
liability 
©2009 Thomson Reuteis/West No Claim to Ong US Gov Woiks 
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Connecticut Genual Slatutes § 52 ">57n piovides in 
lelevant pait 
Liability of political subdivision and its employees, 
officeis and agents Liability of membeis of local 
boaids and commissions (a)(1) Except as otheiwise 
piovidedby law, a political subdivision of the state shall 
be liable foi damages to pcison oi pioperty caused by 
(A) The negligent acts oi omissions of such political 
subdivision oi any employee, officei oi agent theieof 
acting within the scope of his employment oi official 
duties, (B) negligence in the peiformance of functions 
fiom which the political subdivision denves a special 
coi poi ate pi ofit oi pecuniai y benefit, and (C) acts of the 
political subdivision which constitute the cieation oi 
participation m the ci eation of a nuisance pi ovided, no 
cause of action shall be maintained foi damages 
lesultmg fiom mjuiy to any peison oi piopeity by 
means of a defective load oi budge except pursuant to 
section 13a-149 (2) Except as otheiwise piovided by 
law, a political subdivision of the state shall not be 
liable foi damages to peison oi piopeity caused by (A) 
Acts oi omissions of any employee, officei oi agent 
which constitute ciimmal conduct, fiaud, actual malice 
oi wilful misconduct, oi (B) negligent acts oi omissions 
which l equn e the exei cise of judgment oi disci etion as 
an official function of the authonty expiessly oi 
impliedly gianted by law 
""3 Connecticut Geneial Statutes ft 7-4o5 and ft 10-235 aie 
indemnification statutes The plaintiff has not sued any 
individual employee oi agent of the Boaid of Education 
Theiefoie, theie is no defendant who can be identified 
undei those statutes i n Gaudmo } 1cm n of East Hai tfoi d, 
87 Conn App 3S3 86*> A 2d 470 (20(h), the plaintiffs 
failuie to sue an individual employee while lelymg upon 
§ 7-465 vt as fatal 
In Sneai s -\ Genua 763 Conn 22 818 A 2d 37 (7002) 
the Supieme Couit held that failuie to cite Connecticut 
Page 3 
Gcncidl Statutes 52 557n in a complaint was not fatal to 
the plaintiffs case The defendant aigues that the piesent 
case is distinguishable fiom Speais because the plaintiff 
heie does lely on ft 7 465 and ft 10-235, indemnification 
statutes, while the plaintiff in Speai s had plead no statute 
Since the plaintiff has not sued any individual employee oi 
agent of the City of Middletown, oi the Middletown Boaid 
of Education, lehance on ft 7-465 and ft 10 235 is 
unnecessaiy Undei Speais a plaintiff can pioceecl 
dnectly against the Boaid of Education puisuant to § 
52 5v>7n even if she has failed to allege that statute This 
court will not giant the summaiy judgment against the 
plaintiff based on the plaintiffs lefeience to the wiong 
statutes when the facts plead in the Complaint do state a 
cause of action against the Boaid of Education undei § 
52 5S7n 
The defendant's substantive aigument is that the 
defendant's conduct as alleged m the Complaint is based 
on "acts oi omissions which lequne the exeicise of 
judgment oi disci etion as an official function of the 
authonty expiessly oi impliedly gi anted by 
law "ConnecticutGeneial Statutes ft 52 ^57n(a)(2)(B) As 
such the defendant enjoys immunity undei that statute 
The plaintiff aigues that she falls within the class of 
identifiable victims subject to imminent haim, an 
exception to governmental immunity/, undei Dm i ant v 
Boai dot Education of the C//i ofllai tfoi d 96 Conn App 
456 900 A 2d 608 (2006) 
The defendant aigues that Dmiant is at odds with the 
Supi erne Com t decisions of Bui n <> I Boai d ofEduc at ion, 
228 Conn 640 645, 638 A 2d 1 (1994), and Piescotl-\ 
Maiden 273 Conn 59 873 A 2d 175 (2005) 
In Piescoii the plaintiff v\ as scuously mjuied when he 
© 2009 Thomson Reuteis/West No Claim to Ong US Gov Woiks 
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slipped while in the stand0 watching his son play football 
The Couit held that the school and its agents enjoyed 
immunity fi om suit undei fr :>2 557n and that the plaintiff 
did not fall within the identifiable victim exception, 
stating 
Thus fai, the only identifiable class of foieseeable 
victims that we have lecogmzed foi these pm poses is 
that of schoolchildien attending public schools duung 
school houis See id at 640, 873 A 2d 175 sec also 
Pmzvcki v Fan field, supia 244 Conn at 101 „ 708 
A 2d 937 (deteimining whethei theie was sufficient 
evidence of imminent haim to schoolchild) In 
determining that such schoolchildien weie within such 
a class, we focused on the following facts they weie 
intended to be the beneficial les of paiticulai duties of 
caie imposed by law on school officials, they weie 
legally lequn ed to attend school lathei than being theie 
voluntauly, then patents weie thus statutonl) lequued 
to I elmquish then custody to those officials dm mg those 
houis, and, as a mattei of policy, they tiaditionally 
lequne special consideiation m the face of dangeious 
conditions Bums \ Boaid of Education supia 228 
Conn at 648-iQ 638 A 2d 1 None of these kinds of 
consideiations applies to the plaintiff m the piesent 
case, and the applicable consideiations point m the 
opposite dnection 
~4 Pi escott v Men den supi a atp 764 
The Coui t m Dm i ant ostensibly lelymg on Piescott held 
that the plaintiff pai ent of a si\ yeai -old stude nt at a public 
school, Mho was injuied when she slipped and fell on 
school piemises while picking up hei son fiom an aftei 
school da) caie piogi am, fell within the identifiable victim 
exception l\\ his dissent in Dm i ant Judge S( hallei states 
1 jespectfully disagiee vwth this lesult because it 
expands one of the limited exceptions to this geneial 
Page 4 
i ule Because the adult plaintiff was on school pi opei ty 
to pick up hei child, who was attending an 
extiacuiiiculai, aftei school day caie and homewoik 
study pi ogi am, 1 believe that the majoi lty has exceeded 
the fnm standaids established by oui Supieme Couit m 
Bwnsy Bowdof'Education 228 Conn 640 638 A 2d 
1 (19Q4), and moi e i ecenily m P/cuotti Mcndcn,211> 
Conn 7 V? 873 A 2d 175 (200^ 
Dun ant \ Boat d of Education, sum a atpp 472 73 900 
A 2d 608 
Judge Schallei opines that the majonty has misapplied 
Piescott and Bums because I) the plaintiffs piesence at 
the school was puiely voluntary, 2) the plaintiff was 
entitled to no special pi otection by the school because she 
w as a pai ent, not a student, and 3) considei mg the plaintiff 
to be within the class of identifiable victims violates the 
holdings of Bums and Piescott that such class is 
"nanowly defined " 
Wei e this court to apply Bui ns and Pi escott to the facts of 
Dmi ant, the plaintiff would not have fallen withm the 
identifiable victim's exception and the summaiy judgment 
would have been gi anted m favoi of the defendants 
Howevei, the facts of this case aie quite similai to the 
facts of Dun ant and this court is bound by both Pi escott 
and Dun ant The Supieme Court gi anted the defendants' 
petition foi certification foi appeal m Dun ant Dm / ant v 
Boai d of Education of the City offkntfoid 280 Conn 
915 908 A 2d 536 
Based on the afoiementioned state of the law, the Motion 
foi Summaiy Judgment is denied without piejudice to the 
leconsidciation of same if the Supieme Court levei ses the 
l tiling of the Appellate Court in Dun ant oi when the 
plaintiffs status as an identifiable victim is clanfied by 
olhei appellate oi statutoi) authonty 
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